About this topic
Summary Free will is partially an issue in the philosophy of mind, so growing knowledge of the brain - which obviously has some kind of intimate relationship with the mind - might prove relevant to our understanding of free will. Most of the interest in neuroscience by philosophers and scientists has concerned whether neuroscience might show that free will is an illusion; the focus has especially been on whether conscious intentions are epiphenomenal. Neuroscientist might also illuminate how the powers required for free will - rational reflection and decision-making, centrally - are implemented.
Key works Benjamin Libet's [Libet 1999 ] claims about the timing of conscious states has been a central focus of work on this topic. This work has spawned a mini-industry; landmarks here include the papers collected in Libet et al 2010 and - especially - Mele 2009, a monograph that carefully sets out the limits ofLibet's claims. Some neuroscientists have argued that neuroscience eliminates responsibility because the brain is deterministic; Balaguer 2010 is a book-length examination of this claim.
Introductions Banks & Pockett 2007;Mele 2011
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
192 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 192
  1. George J. Agich (2004). Seeking the Everyday Meaning of Autonomy in Neurologic Disorders. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (4):295-298.
  2. Rosemary Agonito (1975). Neurological Information Processing and Free Persons. Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):3-11.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Roksana Alavi (2005). Robert Kane, Free Will, and Neuro-Indeterminism. Philo 8 (2):95-108.
    In this paper I argue that Robert Kane’s defense of event-causal libertarianism, as presented in Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent. I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Roksana Alavi (2005). Robert Kane, Free Will and Neuro-Indeterminism. Philo 8 (2):95-108.
    In this paper I argue that Robert Kane’s defense of event-causal libertarianism, as presented in Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent. I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Joel Anderson (2007). Introduction: Free Will, Neuroscience, and the Participant Perspective. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):3 – 11.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Kristin Andrews (2003). Neurophilosophy of Free Will by Henrik Walter. Philo 6 (1):166-175.
  7. Kristin Andrews (2003). Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy by Henrik Walter. Philo 6 (1):166-175.
  8. Harald Atmanspacher & Stefan Rotter (2011). On Determinacy or its Absence in the Brain. In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Mark Balaguer (2010). Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. Mit Press.
    In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. William P. Banks & Susan Pockett (2007). Benjamin Libet's Work on the Neuroscience of Free Will. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 657--670.
  11. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2009). Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
  12. Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele & Kathleen D. Vohs (eds.) (2010). Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? University Press.
    This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Tim Bayne (2011). Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism. In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
    Free will sceptics claim that we do not possess free will—or at least, that we do not possess nearly as much free will as we think we do. Some free will sceptics hold that the very notion of free will is incoherent, and that no being could possibly possess free will (Strawson this volume). Others allow that the notion of free will is coherent, but hold that features of our cognitive architecture prevent us from possessing free will. My concern in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Helen Beebee (2012). Free Will Sans Metaphysics? Metascience 21 (1):77-81.
    Free will sans metaphysics? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9525-5 Authors Helen Beebee, Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT UK Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Dennis Bielfeldt (2009). Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. By John R. Searle. Zygon 44 (4):999-1002.
  16. Gunnar Björnsson & Derk Pereboom (forthcoming). Comments on Eddy Nahmias, “Is Free Will an Illusion?”. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4. MIT Press.
    Discusses Eddy Nahmias' “Is Free Will an Illusion?”.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Gregory B. Bonn (2013). Re-Conceptualizing Free Will for the 21st Century: Acting Independently with a Limited Role for Consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology 4:920.
    This paper examines the concept of free will, or independent action, in light of recent research in psychology and neuroscience. Reviewing findings in memory, prospection, and mental simulation, as well as the neurological mechanisms underlying behavioral control, planning, and integration, it is suggested in accord with previous arguments (e.g. Harris, 2012; Wegner, 2003) that a folk conception of free will as entirely conscious control over behavior should be rejected. However, it is argued that, when taken together, these findings can also (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Pratima Bowes (1971). Consciousness And Freedom: Three Views. London,: Methuen.
  19. Jean E. Burns (2012). The Action of the Mind. In I. Fredriksson (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness. McFarland. 204.
    It is assumed that mental action, such as free will, exists, and an exploration is made of its relationship to the brain, physical laws, and evolutionary selection. If the assumption is made that all content of conscious experience is encoded in the brain, it follows that free will must act as process only. This result is consistent with the experimental results of Libet and others that if free will exists, it must act by making a selection between alternatives provided by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Jean E. Burns (2010). What Does the Mind Do That the Brain Does Not? In R. L. Amoroso (ed.), The Complementarity of Mind and Body: Fulfilling the Dream of Descartes, Einstein and Eccles. Nova Science.
    Two forms of independent action by consciousness have been proposed by various researchers – free will and holistic processing. (Holistic processing contributes to the formation of behavior through the holistic use of brain programs and encoding.) The well-known experiment of Libet et al. (1983) implies that if free will exists, its action must consist of making a selection among alternatives presented by the brain. As discussed herein, this result implies that any physical changes mind can produce in the brain are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jean E. Burns (1999). Volition and Physical Laws. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (10):27-47.
  22. Graham Cairns-Smith, Thomas W. Clark, Ravi Gomatam, Robert H. Kane, Nicholas Maxwell, J. J. C. Smart, Sean A. Spence & Henry P. Stapp (2005). Commentaries on David Hodgson's "a Plain Person's Free Will&Quot;. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):20-75.
    REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; THE VIEW FROM WITHIN, Sean Spence; COMMENTARY ON HODGSON, Henry Stapp.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Joseph Keim Campbell (2010). Review of Mark Balaguer, Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (5).
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Gregg Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. In this book I examine both the traditional philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will, as well as recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to consciousness (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Gang Chen (2008). Perception Dualism and Free Will. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:13-42.
    This paper is to spell out a version of perception dualism, whose ontological description of the mind-body relation is stronger than property dualism but weaker than substance dualism, that is, to define mental events as perceptions from an internal point of view and physical events as perceptions from an external point of view, then, the author set out to tackle some long-persisting ontological issues in philosophy of mind, such as the psycho-physical interaction, the criterion of mind, the clash between free (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Patricia Churchland, The Big Questions: Do We Have Free Will?
    As neuroscience uncovers these and other mechanisms regulating choices and social behaviour, we cannot help but wonder whether anyone truly chooses anything (though see "Is the universe deterministic?"). As a result, profound questions about responsibility are inescapable, not just regarding criminal justice, but in the day-to-day business of life. Given that, I suggest that free will, as traditionally understood, needs modification. Because of its importance in society, any description of free will updated to fit what we know about the nervous (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Patricia Smith Churchland (2002). Brain Wise. The MIT Press.
    A neurophilosopher?s take on the self, free will, human understanding, and the experience of God, from the perspective of the brain.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Wim E. Crusio (1999). Behavioral Neurogenetics Beyond Determinism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):890-891.
    Rose's Lifelines justifiably attacks the rigid genetic determinism that pervades the popular press and even some scientific writing. Genes do not equate with destiny. However, Rose's argument should not be taken too far: genes do influence behavior, in animals as well as in man.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Dirk De Ridder, Jan Verplaetse & Sven Vanneste (2013). The Predictive Brain and the “Free Will” Illusion. Frontiers in Psychology 4.
    The predictive brain and the “free will” illusion.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. D. A. Drubach, A. A. Rabinstein & J. Molano (2011). Free Will, Freedom of Choice and Frontotemporal Lobar Degeneration. Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):238.
    The question whether human beings have free will has been debated by philosophers and theologians for thousands of years. More recently, neuroscientists have applied novel concepts and tools in neuroscience to address this question. We submit that human beings do have free will and the physiological substrate for its exercise is contained within neural networks. We discuss the potential neurobiology of free will by exploring volitionally initiated motor activity and the behavioural-response to a stimulus-response paradigm. We also submit that the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Joseph Dumit (2003). Is It Me or My Brain? Depression and Neuroscientific Facts. Journal of Medical Humanities 24 (1/2):35-47.
    This article considers the roles played by brain images (e.g., from PET scans) in mass media as experienced by people suffering from mental illness, and as used by scientists and activist groups in demonstrating a biological basis for mental illness. Examining the rhetorical presentation of images in magazines and books, the article describes the persuasive power that brain images have in altering the understanding people have of their own body—their objective self. Analyzing first-person accounts of encounters with brain images, it (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Michael G. Dyer (1994). Quantum Physics and Consciousness, Creativity, Computers: A Commentary on Goswami's Quantum-Based Theory of Consciousness and Free Will. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):265-90.
  33. John C. Eccles (1976). Brain and Free Will. In Gordon G. Globus (ed.), Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Bruce Edmonds, Towards Implementing Free-Will.
    Some practical criteria for free-will are suggested where free-will is a matter of degree. It is argued that these are more appropriate than some extremely idealised conceptions. Thus although the paper takes lessons from philosophy it avoids idealistic approaches as irrelevant. A mechanism for allowing an agent to meet these criteria is suggested: that of facilitating the gradual emergence of free-will in the brain via an internal evolutionary process. This meets the requirement that not only must the choice of action (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Gerard Elfstrom (2008). Scientists and Free Will. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:63-68.
    Many scientists believe that the universe, including the human brain, is governed by natural laws and that all can be explained by natural processes. In consequence, they believe that all events, including brain events, are determined. From this, they often conclude that free will cannot exist. I believe these views are mistaken and will present several lines of argument to support this position. I conclude that the operation of free will is compatible with determinism, can be explained by natural processes (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Francesco Ferretti, Massimo Marraffa & Mario De Caro (eds.) (2007). Cartographies of the Mind: The Interface Between Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Springer.
  37. C. M. Fisher (2001). If There Were No Free Will. Medical Hypotheses 56:364-366.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. A. Flew (1984). Book Reviews : Free Will: A Defence Against Neurophysiological Determinism. By John Thorp. London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. Pp. XII + 162. 8.95. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (4):585-586.
  39. Walter J. Freeman (1999). Neurogenetic Determinism is a Theological Doctrine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):893-894.
    In “Lifelines” Steven Rose constructs a case against neurogenetic determinism based on experimental data from biology and in favor of a significant degree of self determination. Two philosophical errors in the case favoring neurogenetic determinism are illustrated by Rose: category mistakes and an excessively narrow view of causality restricted to the linear form.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Chris D. Frith (2009). Free Will Top-Down Control in the Brain. In. In Nancey Murphy, George Ellis, O. ’Connor F. R. & Timothy (eds.), Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will. Springer Verlag. 199--209.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Christopher D. Frith (1996). Commentary on Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):91-93.
  42. Shaun Gallagher (2006). Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. 109-124.
    Some philosophers argue that Descartes was wrong when he characterized animals as purely physical automata – robots devoid of consciousness. It seems to them obvious that animals (tigers, lions, and bears, as well as chimps, dogs, and dolphins, and so forth) are conscious. There are other philosophers who argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that robots and other artificial agents may someday be conscious – and it is certainly practical to take the intentional stance toward them (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Shaun Gallagher (2005). Consciousness and Free Will. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 39:7-16.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Shaun Gallagher (2005). Intentionality and Intentional Action. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):319-326.
  45. Todd Ganson (2008). Finding Freedom Through Complexity. [REVIEW] Science 319 (5866):1045.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Grant R. Gillett (2001). Free Will and Events in the Brain. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):287-310.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Grant Gillett & Sam C. Liu (2012). Free Will and Necker's Cube: Reason, Language and Top-Down Control in Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophy 87 (01):29-50.
    The debates about human free will are traditionally the concern of metaphysics but neuroscientists have recently entered the field arguing that acts of the will are determined by brain events themselves causal products of other events. We examine that claim through the example of free or voluntary switch of perception in relation to the Necker cube. When I am asked to see the cube in one way, I decide whether I will follow the command (or do as I am asked) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Walter Glannon (ed.) (forthcoming). Free Will and the Brain: Neuroscientific, Philosophical, and Legal Perspectives on Free Will.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Walter Glannon (2013). Obsessions, Compulsions, and Free Will. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (4):333-337.
    Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and other psychiatric disorders can interfere with a person’s capacity to control the nature of his mental states and how they issue in his decisions and actions. Insofar as this sort of control is identified with free will, and psychiatric disorders can impair this control, these disorders can impair free will. The will can be compromised by dysregulated neural networks that disable the mental mechanisms necessary to regulate thought, motivation, and action. Neural and mental dys-function result in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Walter Glannon (2005). Neurobiology, Neuroimaging, and Free Will. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):68-82.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 192