Abstract

Scholars currently offer widely divergent interpretations of Nietzsche's political philosophy as either individualistic or radically aristocratic. Although these divergent interpretations differ in many respects, they nonetheless share an underlying conception of Nietzsche as a philosopher of human freedom. I argue in my dissertation that it becomes possible to understand both the individualistic and aristocratic elements of Nietzsche's mature political philosophy by understanding Nietzsche more accurately as a critic of individual free human agency. ;I develop my interpretation by examining the evolution of Nietzsche's critique of the free will and conception of human agency from Human, All Too Human into his later works. Scholars writing on Nietzsche have generally overlooked the importance of Human, All Too Human as well as the works of Nietzsche's so-called "middle period" writings more generally. In contrast to these scholarly studies, I argue that it is only possible to fully understand Nietzsche's mature moral and political philosophy in light of the critical perspective which he develops and the paradoxes which he encounters during his middle period. Specifically, I demonstrate that Nietzsche's critique of the free will and conception of human necessity that he first formulates in Human, All Too Human reveals the critical perspective on individual freedom that underlies the development of his mature philosophy. ;I maintain that, by understanding Nietzsche as primarily a critic rather than a philosopher of human freedom, it becomes possible to understand the coherence of Nietzsche's mature philosophical doctrines of the will to power and the eternal return. Moreover, I demonstrate that an understanding of the central importance of Nietzsche's critique of human freedom reveals the consistency between his seemingly contradictory combination of individualism and radical aristocracy in his late period, political philosophy. I conclude that Nietzsche's late period philosophy leads to a fatalistic form of individualism which is unable to serve as a successful alternative to contemporary morality. I suggest, however, that it may be possible to provide an alternative to Nietzsche's failings by combining Nietzsche's critical insights on the free will in Human, All Too Human with a recognition of the importance of communal norms for human agency and value creation