Abstract

This project presents a critical, i.e., a philosophical, defense of a theory of sociobiology that is more sensible than that implicit in E. O. Wilson's 1975 Sociobiology: The New Synthesis on both historical and methodological grounds. It is suggested that this "sensible" theory of sociobiology be regarded as an "interfield" theory, one that solves the central problem arising from the domain of species-specific patterns of social behavior. This theory provides a deep, explanatory account of the domain in terms of the significant genetic and ecological properties of social behavior. It relates the fields of ethology, genetics, and ecology through the application of the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution, augmented by the concept of inclusive fitness and the theory of kin selection, by game theory, by optimality analyses, and by principles of group selection, to the explanation of the evolution of social behavior. A principle of biological determinism is proposed that genuinely acknowledges the influence of environmental factors on the expression of individuals' genotypes. A new, genetical concept of human nature is discussed, and it is argued that this principle of biological determinism, and thus the sensible theory of sociobiology that depends on it, does not have the pernicious social and political consequences that critics have seen in Wilson's work. The theory of sociobiology presented here is methodologically cautious where generalizations about the evolution of social behavior of diverse taxa are concerned. Problems of functional and intentional description that arise when sociobiological laws are proposed is discussed. The charge that sociobiological theory is unfalsifiable is considered in detail. The concepts of adaptation, fitness, and optimality are defined, and confusions arising from the failure to draw important distinctions where these terms are concerned are pointed out. The claim that sociobiological theory is unfalsifiable because it subscribes to the adaptationist programme is evaluated in the context of recent work in the philosophy of science