Abstract

In accord with its title this book focuses on the controverted object of Aristotelian metaphysics, under the formula of metaphysica generalis vis-à-vis a metaphysica specialis. It approaches the topic in the Wolffian setting standardized by Natorp, in which theological philosophy is a "regional" study without the universality required for a science of being qua being. Merlan insisted that there never had been a metaphysica generalis in Aristotle. Brinkmann concludes very differently that here Aristotle remained unclear and uncertain. However, in a turning around of Merlan’s meaning through Hegel’s Logik the metaphysica generalis emerges triumphant. It has absorbed into itself the special types of metaphysics as well as the Aristotelian practical and productive sciences in a manner neither found in nor envisaged by the Stagirite himself. In no lesser way, and even then not absolutely, will being qua being coincide with the divine as Merlan wanted. The preoccupation with Merlan at the beginning and end, as well as the proportionately numerous references to him throughout, show emphatically enough that the book aims at a new meaning acceptable as an alternative to Merlan’s elimination of metaphysica generalis from Aristotle’s thought.