Abstract

This essay explores several philosophical objections to war in William James’s “On the Moral Equivalent of War” and “On a Certain Blindness.” More concerned with the interiority of war than just war theory, James provides a modicum of guidance if not also consolation to those readers who object to “war and forms of peace that mean the same thing as war,” i.e., social practices that are inwardly inconsistent with good will toward all life. The strength of one’s opposition to war depends on the correctness of one’s position, certainly, but it also requires a better understanding of the permanent enemy among us, namely, “the bellicosity of human nature.” Beyond the mere intellectual conviction that war is morally unacceptable, or that it is one’s “bounden duty to resist settling reasonable disputes in a violent manner,” one is also obliged – suggests James – to translate one’s beliefs into an active yet non-violent resistance to the human proclivity to settle disputes “quickly, thrillingly, tragically, and by force.”