Abstract

I argue that Kant's Humanity formula of the categorical imperative provides an objective ground for moral theory. I argue that his universal law formula is misguided in its attempt to require strict universality of particular maxims. Instead, I claim that strict universality only applies to the Humanity formula itself. ;The Humanity formula requires us to respect rational nature as an end and to never use rational nature as a mere means. Rational nature for Kant is the power to set an end and to act for it. Setting something as end involves regarding it as good. Because we can only recognize rational nature by means of the empirical ends that it sets for itself, I conclude that any application of the Humanity formula requires appeal to independent conceptions of the good. ;Deontology is distinguished from consequentialism by means of the relation that is said to hold between the good and the right. Consequentialists hold that it is necessary to identify the good first, then right action is defined as that which promotes the good. Deontologists, on the other hand, hold that the right can be identified without appeal to any independent notions of the good, and good action is whatever conforms to the right. Since the Humanity formula's requirement of respecting rational nature identifies the right without appeal to any independent notions of the good, it is a deontological principle. Since its application requires appeal to the ends we actually set and thus requires appeal to independent conceptions of the good, its application is consequentialist. Thus, Kantian-consequentialism. ;Chapter I is an examination of Kant's Universal Law formula and its application. Chapter II is an examination of the Humanity formula. There I defend this principle's objectivity and explore its relation to the Universal Law formula. Chapter III is devoted to defending the claim that adopting an end as one's own requires a feeling of concern for that end which is non-rational and thus cannot be known a priori. This chapter reinforces the claim that the application of principle that requires respect for end setting beings also requires empirical knowledge that prevents particular maxims from being strictly universal. Chapter IV is a demonstration, by means of examples, that Kantian-consequentialism can successfully blend some of the pre-reflective motivations of both Kantian and consequentialist theories of morality. Although the Kantian component dominates