Some Comments to R. Aquila's Paper ‘Kantian Appearances, Intentional Gegenstände, and Some Varieties of Phenomenalism’

Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 1 (1) (2020)
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Abstract

In my commentary, I write, firstly, of the dualistic (ambivalent) use of the concept ‘appearance’ by Kant and, secondly, of the need for a semantic (referential) interpretation of the Kantian concept ‘‘appearance’ as opposed to intentional interpretation of R.Aquilla. In his reply to my objections, R. Aquila precisies his initial position and gives additional arguments in it’s favor.

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Author Profiles

Sergey Katrechko
Higher School of Economics
Richard E. Aquila
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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