Abstract

Ronald Dworkin, in a large body of work over the last quarter century, defends a form of liberalism which is egalitarian in nature. He argues that equality is the only coherent foundational moral/political principle of justice, and is best understood as equality of resources ; and that, politically, the state must show its citizens equal concern and respect. His theory of equality assimilates a defense of liberty and the irrevocable rights of individuals, as well as an argument about the proper way we should understand the relationship between the individual and the community. ;Hegel, by contrast, presents a moral and political theory founded solely on an analysis of liberty, a theory both imminent and historical in nature. I attempt to show how Hegel's philosophy of recht can not only counter the arguments made by Dworkin on equality's and liberty's behalf, but can also provide us with a richer account of freedom, rights and duties, and the community. My contention is that Dworkin's defense of egalitarian liberalism fails on several Hegelian grounds. First, equality itself can not be the foundation for a moral or political theory. Secondly, the version of equality Dworkin promotes misunderstands the nature of the political state and the individual's relationship to it. Thirdly, liberty, primarily conceived by Dworkin in the "negative" sense, misconstrues in what freedom consists, what a free personality is, and how normative validity can only be attained through the self-determination of freedom. Hegel's philosophy of recht provides us with a more comprehensive account of the nature of liberty, the relationship between the historical determinations of freedom and the law, and the way in which modern society allows for freedom. While remaining silent on the extent to which Hegel's theory of the state could be appropriated for our situation, I nevertheless conclude that Hegel's political philosophy, his account of liberty within modern society and of the relationship between liberty and the law, remains preferable to Dworkin's egalitarian political morality