Abstract

This dissertation discusses Plotinus's views on the limits of discursive rationality, or dianoia. It shows how dianoia is out of place in the higher hypostases of Plotinus's ontological system. A symptom of this displacement is that when discursive rationality is applied to the higher hypostases it generates logical inconsistencies or paradoxes, which I call "paradoxes of misplaced discursivity." Such paradoxes include: that Nous is both identical to and different from its objects, the Forms; that the Forms themselves are both all one and each separate and individual; that the human soul in contemplation is both identical to and different from Nous. ;Although dianoia is, strictly speaking, insufficient for gaining knowledge of the higher hypostases, it is nonetheless necessary in this pursuit. It is required as part of a process of philosophical purification that is a pre-requisite to having a Noetic insight into the nature of the Forms. ;Generally, Plotinus self-consciously uses dianoetic argumentation to generate the paradoxes mentioned above. Plotinus does this in order to show his disciples the futility of relying upon unaided discursivity, and to forcefully move them beyond the level of Soul, which is dianoia's proper home, and to urge them into the higher regions through mystical experience. This process entails an ontological shift, as the mystic moves beyond the conventionally human realm and into the higher hypostases. ;Plotinus attacks the notion that dianoia alone is sufficient for gaining higher knowledge. These attacks produce interesting philosophical problems concerning the status of his own argumentation, since the great bulk of his writing itself is composed of dianoetic reasoning. There is thus a tension between the discursive and the mystical moments in Plotinus's philosophy. I controversially conclude that Plotinus's mysticism is the centerpiece of his philosophy, and that his mystical experiences are what guide the rest of his thought and writing