Abstract

Critical theory, as developed by Max Horkheimer during the 1930s, is not a selfsufficient academic philosophy remote from life, but is connected with individual, everyday experiences and an interest in the abolition of social injustice. Consequently, its tenets cannot be dissociated either from the substance of those experiences, or from the tissue of their derivation. Their truth remains bound to constellations of social reality. Bearing this in mind, we may distinguish “Critical Theory” from two opposite forms of philosophical and scientific self‐understanding. One of these regards itself as independent of such constellations. The other acknowledges them, but reduces this understanding to a general perception of correspondences between mind and matter. In contrast, Critical Theory traces the dependence of consciousness on social existence with the aim of abolishing that dependence. It thus, on the one hand, represents critical unrest vis‐à‐vis all putative first and last certainties, vis‐à‐vis metaphysics and ontology, vis‐à‐vis all thinking that has forgotten its own contingency. On the other hand, it retains the emphatic concept of truth of its philosophical tradition, and thus avoids disintegrating into an indecisive relativism in which everything would be equally true or equally false.