Why Robots Can't Become Racist, and Why Humans Can

PhaenEx 9 (1):57 (2014)
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Abstract

This essay draws together the disciplines of race theory, artificial intelligence, and phenomenology to engage the issue of racism as a learned phenomenon. More specifically, it centres on a comparison between robots and humans with respect to becoming racist. The purpose of this comparison is to illustrate the complex interconnections between racism, ontology, and learning. The essay begins with a discussion of race and racism that identifies both fundamentally as social realities. With this account, the essay draws on Hubert Dreyfus’ critical phenomenological work on artificial intelligence to outline several limitations for robots becoming racist. Next, the essay turns to the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty as an ontological alternative for describing human beings and how racism is learned through habit and skill acquisition. In the end, it is suggested that this investigation not only provides an insightful glimpse into racism as a learned phenomenon, but also invites further discussion on how such racism may be confronted when it is viewed not simply as a cognitive issue, but rather as an issue of embodiment.

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Intelligence without representation.Rodney A. Brooks - 1991 - Artificial Intelligence 47 (1--3):139-159.

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