Abstract

This dissertation is a study of the nature of works of art and the relation between constitutive properties and aesthetic properties of works of art. I begin by probing the questions of whether or not there is such a thing as aesthetic property and what are the characteristics of aesthetic properties in the case of works of art if aesthetic property exists. I classify aesthetic predicates used to capture aesthetic properties into three types: empirical, phenomenal, and ascriptive. I favor aesthetic predicates in the ascriptive sense, for they are more adequate than others for explaining intentional underpinnings of works of art and the interpretive identification of them. ;I relate the idea of the intentionality of the constitution of works of art to Margolis' ontological account of them. He construes works of art as physically embodied and culturally emergent entities. I supply a revision of his notion of artifactuality as a necessary condition for art for the purpose of securing the source of persistence and reidentification of artworks. ;Since physical embodiment and cultural emergence of works of art do not rely on mere perceptual discernibility of compositional qualities of artworks, I reexamine the indiscernibility thesis and note that the thesis cannot capture metaphysically important aspects of phenomena exhibited by works of art. To supply a metaphysical account of perceptually indiscernible but culturally significant phenomena of artworks, I expound Margolis' notion of cultural emergence while surveying various models of emergence in science. I conclude that the model of cultural emergence is superior to other models of emergence in its ability of embracing emergent properties that are construed as real, novel and causally efficacious. ;I consider the supervenience model to explicate further the relation between constitutive properties and aesthetic properties of artworks. I find the theory of supervenience unable to provide adequate accounts of constitutive properties of works of art which are constituted of complex relational properties. I conclude the dissertation by suggesting some constraints necessary for making the supervenience model viable as a tool for justification in art criticism