Criminal Punishment and Free Will

In David Boonin, Katrina L. Sifferd, Tyler K. Fagan, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Michael Huemer, Daniel Wodak, Derk Pereboom, Stephen J. Morse, Sarah Tyson, Mark Zelcer, Garrett VanPelt, Devin Casey, Philip E. Devine, David K. Chan, Maarten Boudry, Christopher Freiman, Hrishikesh Joshi, Shelley Wilcox, Jason Brennan, Eric Wiland, Ryan Muldoon, Mark Alfano, Philip Robichaud, Kevin Timpe, David Livingstone Smith, Francis J. Beckwith, Dan Hooley, Russell Blackford, John Corvino, Corey McCall, Dan Demetriou, Ajume Wingo, Michael Shermer, Ole Martin Moen, Aksel Braanen Sterri, Teresa Blankmeyer Burke, Jeppe von Platz, John Thrasher, Mary Hawkesworth, William MacAskill, Daniel Halliday, Janine O’Flynn, Yoaav Isaacs, Jason Iuliano, Claire Pickard, Arvin M. Gouw, Tina Rulli, Justin Caouette, Allen Habib, Brian D. Earp, Andrew Vierra, Subrena E. Smith, Danielle M. Wenner, Lisa Diependaele, Sigrid Sterckx, G. Owen Schaefer, Markus K. Labude, Harisan Unais Nasir, Udo Schuklenk, Benjamin Zolf & Woolwine (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy. Springer Verlag. pp. 63-76 (2018)
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Abstract

This chapter examines the restrictions on justification of punishment that result from the claim that human beings lack freedom of the will. The variety of free will at issue is the control in action required for the agent to basically deserve to be blamed or punished. If we lack such free will, the classical retributive justification is undermined. Furthermore, if we lack such free will, one justification for using criminals as means for the purpose of general deterrence is also threatened. Since even if we lack free will, we yet retain the right to harm in self-defense, special deterrence that invokes such a right, and the attendant general deterrence, are in the clear. Finally, ways in which additional general deterrence absent free will might be justified are explored.

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Derk Pereboom
Cornell University

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