Abstract

G. F. Meier was born in Halle in 1718 and died there after an uneventful life in 1777. He may not be well known to the English speaking public, but he is important because he was among the most authoritative figures of the Aufklärung and in particular because his influence on Kant was considerable. In accordance with the understanding of logic that prevailed during the eighteenth century, Meier’s Vernunftlehre and its abridgment for courses, the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, both published in 1752, are at the same time and especially an introduction to the whole of philosophy. In fact, their goal is not just the elaboration of the formal aspects of logic, but rather the individuation of the elements of thought and language that make human cognition possible. What is peculiar in Meier’s approach is that instead of limiting himself to formal truth, he includes in his logic all kinds of epistemic truths. Meier deals not only with “dogmatic” and “historical” truths, but also with “merely aesthetic,” “merely philosophical,” and even “aesthetical-philosophical” truths. Moreover, Meier’s logic is not only inclusive of aesthetics, it is at the same time rhetoric. In fact, at the beginning of both books, Meier declares that under Vernunftlehre he understands a science that deals with the rules of philosophical cognition and philosophical speech. Kant adopted Meier’s two logic books for his lectures on logic for forty years. It is not at all surprising, then, that Kant’s own logical writings and even his Critique of Pure Reason were influenced by Meier. So too, one finds in Kant’s Reflections on Logic and Lectures on Logic elaborations of some of the fundamental issues addressed by Meier, such as the analysis of prejudices and the articulation of the conditions for the constitution of a horizon. In this context, Locke’s philosophy plays an especially important role. In fact, Meier served as mediator between Locke and Kant. Meier not only knew Locke well and appealed to his theories in his writings; he also helped to introduce Lockean issues such as the “extent of human knowledge” and the “degrees of assent” to the teaching of logic in the German universities; and, most important, he made such issues salient for the philosophy of Kant.