David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (3):147-156 (2002)
“Paraconsistent” means “beyond the consistent” [3, 15]. Paraconsistent logics tolerate inconsistencies in a way that traditional logics do not. In a paraconsistent logic, the inference of explosion A, ∼AB is rejected. This may be for any of a number of reasons . For proponents of relevance [1, 2] the argument has gone awry when we infer an irrelevant B from the inconsistent premises. Those who argue that inconsistent theories may have some logical content but do not commit us to everything, have reason to think that these theories are closed under a relation of paraconsistent logical consequence [12, 18]. Another reason to adopt a paraconsistent logic is more extreme. You may take the world to be inconsistent , and a true theory incorporating this inconsistency must be governed by a paraconsistent logic.
|Keywords||paraconsistent logic intuitionistic logic quantum logic|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Newton C. A. da Costa & Décio Krause, Remarks on the Applications of Paraconsistent Logic to Physics.
Joseph Wayne Smith (1986). Logic and the Consistency of the World. Erkenntnis 24 (2):105 - 114.
Andrzej Wiśniewski, Guido Vanackere & Dorota Leszczyńska (2005). Socratic Proofs and Paraconsistency: A Case Study. Studia Logica 80 (2-3):431 - 466.
Heinrich Wansing (2006). Contradiction and Contrariety. Priest on Negation. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):81-93.
Pablo Cobreros (2010). Paraconsistent Vagueness: A Positive Argument. Synthese 183 (2):211-227.
Dominic Hyde & Mark Colyvan (2008). Paraconsistent Vagueness: Why Not? Australasian Journal of Logic 6:107-121.
Bryson Brown (1999). Yes, Virginia, There Really Are Paraconsistent Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):489-500.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads39 ( #51,632 of 1,410,540 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #58,228 of 1,410,540 )
How can I increase my downloads?