Philosophy of Science 60 (4):558-567 (1993)
|Abstract||The paper claims that analytic philosophy has failed within the philosophy of science due to the way the dynamic aspect of scientific theories is traditionally treated. On the formal side this failure manifests itself in the first-order logical and the model-theoretic analyses of scientific theories. An amendment of the treatment is sketched. It is based on using model generation, of the kind used in proving the Completeness Theorem for first-order logic, in such a way that some dynamic quantities in the dynamic theory are formally represented as functions relating closed terms and sentences to their interpretations in a generated model|
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