Interpretation and the Problem of Authorial Intention
Dissertation, The Catholic University of America (
1998)
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Abstract
The dissertation shows that the arguments advanced by E. D. Hirsch for authorial intention as the criterion of interpretation do not provide a basis for validity in interpretation because the subject-object ontology underlying those arguments is incompatible with the idea of the identity of a text's meaning. The dissertation argues that, inasmuch as Hirsch's model of interpretation presupposes the total separation of meaning and significance and restricts the meaning of the text to the author's intention, it establishes an insurmountable gap between text and interpreter. This dissertation will attempt to show that H.-G. Gadamer's approach to interpretation succeeds where Hirsch's fails in providing a basis for a legitimate and true interpretation. ;For Gadamer, we can only understand a text by assuming that we share a common linguistic horizon. The horizon itself, however, is grounded in the ontological features of the subject-matter of the text. These ontological features, he maintains, manifest themselves in the dialogical character of language and provide a transcendental ground for the possibility of giving a true interpretation of a text. The meaning of a text thus retains an identity, in Gadamer's view, but it is also capable of assuming an indefinite variety of finite expressions for its content. Gadamer accordingly argues that the meaning of a text cannot be legitimately equated with the intentions of its author. ;In Chapter One, the problem of relativity and objectivity in interpretation is presented. In this context, the problem of method and subject-object ontology is discussed. Chapter Two turns to the problem of the identification of meaning with authorial intention. The intentionalist approaches of Knapp, Michaels, Juhl, and Hirsch are criticized. It also delineates Gadamer's approach to the identification of the author. In Chapter Three, the problem of textual identity is discussed in terms of Hirsch's and E. Betti's distinction between meaning and significance. After presenting the dynamic identity of the text in Gadamer, it is argued that textual identity reveals itself in the truth-claim of the text. Chapter Four attempts to articulate how the ontological characteristics of textual meaning can, as Gadamer argues, provide a basis for truthfulness in interpretation