David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (March):83-97 (1986)
Intentionality, as Brentano originally introduced the term in modern philosophy, was meant to provide a distinctive characteristic definitively separating the mental from the physical.(1) Mental states have an intrinsic relationship to an object, to that which they are "about." Physical entities just are what they are, they cannot, by their very essence, refer to anything, they have no "outreach", as one might put it. Mental states have, as it were, an incomplete essence, they cannot exist at all unless they are completed by something other than themselves, their object. Brentano's position is opposed to all theories which represent the mental as only extrinsically related to the world, that is, to all theories in which mental states are themselves self-sufficient for their own existence and only secondarily relate to the world by means of something external to their nature, e.g., neurological causation, divine intervention, or pre-established harmony. In these later cases, any mental act whatsoever could be related to any object, or indeed to none, for the relation is external to the nature of the act, it is superimposed on it by outside forces. Brentano's point is that a mental act has, by its very essence, an Intentional object without which it would not be a mental act. It would therefore appear that since causality is an external relationship which could in principle relate any two things regardless of their nature, the Intentional relation between an act and its object cannot be a causal relation.
|Keywords||Action Theory Causality Intentionality Metaphysics Searle, J|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Chris Fields (1987). Human-Computer Interaction: A Critical Synthesis. Social Epistemology 1 (1):5 – 25.
Similar books and articles
Nicholas S. Thompson & Patrick G. Derr (1993). The Intentionality of Some Ethological Terms. Behavior and Philosophy 2 (21):15-24.
Anthonie W. M. Meijers (2000). Mental Causation and Searle's Impossible Conception of Unconscious Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):155-170.
Richard E. Aquila (1976). Intentionality: A Study Of Mental Acts. Penn St University Press.
Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 229-251.
Tim Crane (2009). Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press 474--493.
John R. Searle (1984). Intentionality and its Place in Nature. Synthese 38 (October):87-100.
David M. Armstrong (1991). Intentionality, Perception, and Causality. In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell
Anders Nes (2008). Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional? Analysis 68 (299):205–215.
Tim Crane (forthcoming). Intentionality. Philosophical Explorations.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads95 ( #42,549 of 1,796,321 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #169,168 of 1,796,321 )
How can I increase my downloads?