Abstract

the lack and the ambiguity of sources about Philo of Larissa make it very difficult to establish what the “roman innovations” were. the purpose of the present study is to suggest some hypothesis concerning this issue, assuming that Philo’s epistemology is based on the carneadian concept of πιθανόν. according to the “Philonian πιθανόν”, we cannot distinguish with certainty between true or false impressions and therefore we are not able to grasp the truth: however, such a limitation does not involve a suspension of judgement on all questions. the “Philonian πιθανόν” is confined to the realm of the apparent knowledge/truth, allowing the rise of a δόξα which is not unworthy of the wise person. the πιθαναὶ φαντασίαι might actually be the object the wise person gives his assent to and, in so doing, they also represent an effective way for man to approach the truth