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  1. Four probability-preserving properties of inferences.Ernest W. Adams - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (1):1 - 24.
    Different inferences in probabilistic logics of conditionals 'preserve' the probabilities of their premisses to different degrees. Some preserve certainty, some high probability, some positive probability, and some minimum probability. In the first case conclusions must have probability I when premisses have probability 1, though they might have probability 0 when their premisses have any lower probability. In the second case, roughly speaking, if premisses are highly probable though not certain then conclusions must also be highly probable. In the third case (...)
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  • A note on two theorems by Adams and M c Gee.Moritz Schulz - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):509-516.
    Three-valued accounts of conditionals frequently promise (a) to conform to the probabilistic view that conditionals are evaluated by conditional probabilities, and (b) to yield a plausible account of compounds of conditionals. However, McGee (1981) shows that probabilistic validity, the conception of validity most naturally associated with the probabilistic view, cannot be characterized by a finite matrix. Adams (1995) indicates a further generalization of this result. Nevertheless, Adams (1986) provides a description of probabilistic validity in three-valued terms by going beyond the (...)
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