Recent scholarship in science, technology, and society has emphasized the neoliberal character of science today. This article draws on the history of US science and technology policy to argue against thinking of recent changes in science as fundamentally neoliberal, and for thinking of them instead as reflecting a process of “economization.” The policies that changed the organization of science in the United States included some that intervened in markets and others that expanded their reach, and were promoted by some groups (...) who were skeptical of free markets and others who embraced them. In both cases, however, new policies reflected growing political concern with “the economy” and related abstractions and a new understanding of S&T as inputs into a larger economic system that government could manipulate through policy. Understanding trends in US S&T policy as resulting from economization, not just neoliberalism, has implications for thinking about the present and likely future of science and S&T policy. (shrink)

Recent work in science and technology studies has looked at how chemical industries manufacture doubt about the toxicity of their products and manage to establish their scientific views in the field of international regulations on toxic substances. Rather than examining yet another “victory” for the industry, this article analyzes the deployment of a “pro-industrial” scientific position, punctuated mainly by failure and opposition. This trajectory is tracked through the analysis of several data sets: archives, scientific documentation, and sociological interviews. The first (...) part of the article charts the development of a biochemical concept, “peroxisome proliferation,” within an academic subfield and its subsequent appropriation by certain industrial parties who used it as a defensive weapon for their commercial interests. Through the example of the International Agency for Research on Cancer and its network of interdependent institutions, the article goes on to analyze the multiple attempts of chemical industry players to establish their interpretation of the concept within the regulatory bodies for carcinogenic substances. The study of such systems of sociological interdependence shows that a full analysis of the “doubt manufacturing” requires an examination not only of the manufacturing process but also of the reception of the ideas produced. (shrink)

Research on the influence of industry on chemical regulation has mostly been conducted within the framework of the production of ignorance. This special issue extends this research by looking at how industry asserts its interests––not just in the scientific sphere but also at other stages of policy-making and regulatory process––with a specific focus on the types of tools or instruments industry has used. Bringing together sociologists and historians specialized in Science and Technology Studies, the articles of the special issue study (...) the arenas in which instruments and practical guidelines for public policy are negotiated or used. The aim is to observe the devices in the making or in action, from the selection of actors to the production of thresholds, criteria, and other technical regulations. The introduction highlights how industry influence on expertise and regulation is undoubtedly far more pervasive and multifarious than has been conceptualized to date by social scientists. Putting this issue back at the heart of both the STS and social sciences research agendas is increasingly urgent and could lead to new inquiries able to highlight these logics even more widely, using fresh empirical examples. (shrink)

Resistance by physicians, medical researchers, medical educators, and medical students to pharmaceutical industry influence in medicine is often based on the notion that physicians and the industry are in conflict. This criticism has taken the form of a professional movement opposing conflict of interest in medicine and medical education and has resulted in policies and guidelines that frame COI as the problem and outline measures to address this problem. In this paper, I offer a critique of this focus on COI (...) that is grounded in a broader critique of neo-liberalism, arguing it individualizes the relationship between physicians and industry, too neatly delineates between the two entities, and reduces the network of social, economic, and political relations to this one dilemma. (shrink)

Many research-intensive universities have moved into the business of promoting technology development that promises revenue, impact, and legitimacy. While the scholarship on academic capitalism has documented the general dynamics of this institutional shift, we know less about the ground-level challenges of research priority and scientific problem choice. This paper unites the practice tradition in science and technology studies with an organizational analysis of decision-making to compare how two university artificial intelligence labs manage ambiguities at the edge of scientific knowledge. One (...) lab focuses on garnering funding through commercialization schemes, while the other is oriented to federal science agencies. The ethnographic comparison identifies the mechanisms through which an industry-oriented lab can be highly adventurous yet produce a research program that is thin and erratic due to a priority placed on commercialization. However, the comparison does not yield an implicit nostalgia for federalized science; it reveals the mechanisms through which agency-oriented labs can pursue a thick and consistent research portfolio but in a strikingly myopic fashion. (shrink)

A rise of academic capitalism over the past four decades has been well documented within many research-intensive universities. Largely missing, however, are in-depth studies of how particularly situated academic groups manage the uncertainties that come with intermittent and fickle commercial funding streams in their daily research practice and problem choice. To capture the strategies scientists adopt under these conditions, this article provides an ethnographically detailed (and true) story about how a single project in Artificial Intelligence grew over several years from (...) a peripheral idea to the very center of an academic lab’s commercial portfolio. The analysis theorizes an epistemic form—nimble knowledge production—and documents three of its lab-level features: 1) rapid prototyping to keep sunk costs low, 2) shared search for “real world problems” rather than “theoretical” ones, and 3) nimble commitment to research problem choice. While similar forms of academic knowledge transfer have been lauded as “mode 2,” “innovative,” or “hybrid” for initiating cross-institutional collaboration and pushing science beyond disciplinary silos, this case suggests it can rely on fleeting attention to problems resistant to a quick fix. (shrink)

Efforts to foster transparency in biopharmaceutical regulation are well underway: drug manufacturers are, for example, legally required to register clinical trials and share research results in the United States and Europe. Recently, the policy conversation has shifted toward the disclosure of clinical trial data, not just trial designs and basic results. Here, I argue that clinical trial registration and disclosure of clinical trial data are necessary but insufficient. There is also a need to ensure that regulatory decisions that flow from (...) clinical trials — whether positive (i.e., product approvals) or negative (i.e., abandoned products, product refusals, and withdrawals) — are open to outside scrutiny. Further, a jurisprudence of drug regulation is needed. I develop two arguments motivated by (1) innovation concerns and (2) the value of good governance in support of openly publishing all final decisions for approved, abandoned, refused, and withdrawn products. After articulating why greater transparency in regulatory decision-making is needed, I distil four essential features of a jurisprudence of drug regulation that prescribe policy changes in terms not only of the transparency of regulatory outcomes and the underlying reasoning, but also regulatory organization. (shrink)

Efforts to ensure greater transparency in the regulation of “drugs” are well underway. For example, laws in the United States and Europe now require registration of most clinical trials beyond phase 1. Yet instances of avoidable harm to patients continue to arise. In response, calls for disclosure of clinical trial data in the form of “clinical study reports,” not just trial designs and basic results, are growing. In this paper, I argue that disclosure of clinical trial data is necessary but (...) insufficient. Rather, the regulatory decisions that flow from those trial data —whether positive or negative —should also be open to outside scrutiny provided they are final in nature. (shrink)