Mikio Akagi
Texas Christian University
Functionalism is widely regarded as the central doctrine in the philosophy of cognitive science, and is invoked by philosophers of cognitive science to settle disputes over methodology and other puzzles. I describe a recent dispute over extended cognition in which many commentators appeal to functionalism. I then raise an objection to functionalism as it figures in this dispute, targeting the assumption that generality and abstraction are tightly correlated. Finally, I argue that the new mechanist framework offers more realistic resources for understanding cognitive science, and hence is a better source of appeal for resolving disagreement in philosophy of science.
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References found in this work BETA

Sensations and Brain Processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.
Extended Cognition and Functionalism.Mark Sprevak - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):503-527.

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