Review of mark Rowlands' the nature of consciousness [Book Review]

Authors
Torin Alter
University of Alabama
Abstract
In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands argues that phenomenal properties, which constitute what it is like to have a conscious experience, are “transcendental”: that they are properties by which we are conscious of the nonphenomenal world, but they are not objects of conscious awareness or even linguistic reference. He uses that conclusion to support a mysterian position on the explanatory-gap problem: that it is impossible to understand how phenomenal consciousness arises from physical systems such as the brain.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,954
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Neurophilosophy of Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 418--430.
A Natural Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2001 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1):39-59.
Two Dogmas of Consciousness.Mark Rowlands - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):158-80.
The Nature of Consciousness—Mark Rowlands.Torin Alter - 2007 - International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):373-375.
Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto.Mark Rowlands - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
1 ( #1,080,668 of 2,293,909 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
0

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes

Sign in to use this feature