Yes to Realism! No to Non-naturalism!

Kritike 3 (1):98 (2009)
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Abstract

According to contemporary moral realism a moral property, like goodness or badness, is either a natural property or a non-natural property of actions or situations. Contemporary moral naturalists like Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon, and David Brink are a group of philosophers who are often referred to as Cornell realists because of their connection with Cornell University. Frank Jackson is another contemporary moral naturalist who is one of the leaders of The Canberra Planners at the Australian National University with which he is connected. Jackson defends “the most extreme form of naturalism.” Jackson’s view is considered extremeby those who disagree with him because he believes that moral properties are reducible or identical to natural properties. This view of Jackson is opposed by contemporary non-naturalists like Jonathan Dancy, Derek Parfit, and Russ Shafer-Landau for reasons which in my view are not successful. Despite Jackson’s reductionism about the ethical, the Cornell realists, nevertheless, agree with him that moral properties are natural properties.

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References found in this work

Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Supervenience as a philosophical concept.Jaegwon Kim - 1990 - Metaphilosophy 21 (1-2):1-27.
[Omnibus Review].Barry Loewer - 1984 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (4):1411-1413.
On moral properties.Jonathan Dancy - 1981 - Mind 90 (359):367-385.
Nonnaturalism.Jonathan Dancy - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.

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