Empty de re attitudes about numbers

Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):163-188 (2008)
I dub a certain central tradition in philosophy of language (and mind) the de re tradition. Compelling thought experiments show that in certain common cases the truth conditions for thoughts and public-language expressions categorically turn on external objects referred to, rather than on linguistic meanings and/or belief assumptions. However, de re phenomena in language and thought occur even when the objects in question don't exist. Call these empty de re phenomena. Empty de re thought with respect to numeration is explored in this paper, and such thought with respect to hallucinations is touched on
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/nkn025
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Keith S. Donnellan (1974). Speaking of Nothing. Philosophical Review 83 (1):3-31.
Jody Azzouni (1998). On "on What There Is". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):1–18.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jody Azzouni (2011). Singular Thoughts (Objects-Directed Thoughts). Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):45-61.
Jody Azzouni (2011). II—Jody Azzouni: Singular Thoughts. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):45-61.

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