Knowability and possible epistemic oddities
In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 105--125 (2009)
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Citations of this work
The Church–Fitch knowability paradox in the light of structural proof theory.Paolo Maffezioli, Alberto Naibo & Sara Negri - 2012 - Synthese 190 (14):2677-2716.
Discovering knowability: a semantic analysis.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
A Multimodal Pragmatic Treatment of the Knowability Paradox.Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi & Davide Sergio - 2017 - In Gillman Payette & Rafal Urbaniak (eds.), Applications of Formal Philosophy. The Road Less Travelled. Berlin: Springer International Publishing AG. pp. 195-209.
Lost in translation: unknowable propositions in probabilistic frameworks.Eleonora Cresto - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3955-3977.
