Autonomous psychology: What it should and should not entail

Philosophy of Science Association 1984:43 - 55 (1984)
In the wake of the cognitivist revolution in psychology, a number of philosophers (e.g., Putnam and Fodor) have argued that the functional ontology underlying cognitivism allows for the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience. It is contended that these arguments do not support the kind of autonomy proposed and that, in any case, such autonomy would be misguided. The last claim is supported by considering the consequences such autonomy would have for a number of research programmes in cognitive psychology. It is argued that these programmes might benefit from neuroscience. The manner in which this benefit can be acquired without requiring that psychology be reduced to neuroscience is sketched
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