Intuitionistic Completeness for First Order Classical Logic

Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (1):304-312 (1999)
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Abstract

In the past sixty years or so, a real forest of intuitionistic models for classical theories has grown. In this paper we will compare intuitionistic models of first order classical theories according to relevant issues, like completeness, consistency, and relationship between a connective and its interpretation in a model. We briefly consider also intuitionistic models for classical $\omega$-logic. All results included here, but a part of the proposition below, are new. This work is, ideally, a continuation of a paper by McCarty, who considered intuitionistic completeness mostly for first order intuitionistic logic.

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Stefano Berardi
Università degli Studi di Torino

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