Peirce’s graphs amended

History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (2):101-106 (1998)
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Abstract

One of the claims made for C. S. Peirce's existential graphs has been that they are a deductively complete formulation of first-order logic with identity. As Peirce presented them, this is true only for certain versions of first-order logic :those which do not include terms for individuals. I amend Peirce's rules here, showing, in particular, how they are capable of demonstrating that, for instance, ?Jack is in the kitchen? contradicts ?Jack is not in the kitchen?

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References found in this work

Semantics for existential graphs.Eric M. Hammer - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (5):489-503.
The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce.Don D. Roberts - 1975 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 11 (2):128-139.

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