Disputatio 4 (31):215 - 234 (2011)

Authors
David Botting
De La Salle University (PhD)
Abstract
Can a collective be an agent in its own right? Can it be the bearer of moral and other properties that we have traditionally reserved for individual agents? The answer, as one might expect, is ‘In some ways yes, in other ways no.’ The way in which the answer is ‘Yes’ has been described recently by Copp; I intend to discuss his position and defend it against objections. This describes a fairly weak form of autonomy that I will claim does not require the abandonment of methodological individualism or our commonplace intuitions about individual responsibility. I will also discuss, and reject, a stronger conception of autonomy suggested especially by the work of Pettit that would result in methodological individualism.
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DOI 10.2478/disp-2011-0009
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References found in this work BETA

How To Share An Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29-50.
Groups with Minds of Their Own.Philip Pettit - 2003 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.
The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis.David Copp - 2007 - Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (3):369–388.
Group Agency and Supervenience.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.
Plural Agents.Bennett Helm - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):17–49.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Collectivity of Blaming.David Botting - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1-39.

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