Abstract

The rapid growth of neuroscience in the twentieth century raises questions about the relationship between psychological and neurological explanations of human action. Paul Churchland's theory of eliminative materialism says the trajectory of explanation is away from psychology and toward neuroscience, thereby raising the possibility that someday psychological concepts will disappear from our vocabulary. I open this essay by arguing why I consider eliminative materialism a coherent set of philosophical claims which should be engaged seriously. I proceed to call its core principles into question by identifying reasons why we still use psychological concepts. I conclude that, far from being at risk of elimination, psychological explanations could assume an expanded role in the future. ;Most philosophers who oppose eliminative materialism highlight the merits of "folk psychology," the principles we use to explain action in terms of propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires. I believe this is not the best strategy to use against Churchland because eliminative materialism seems to be far-fetched when dealing with ordinary action in people without brain dysfunction, but plausible when dealing with people whose brain lesions may explain their deviant behaviors. The linchpin of my argument against Churchland, then, is that even in cases marked by well-characterized brain pathology , psychological concepts may retain critical diagnostic and therapeutic roles. And if psychology is relevant in cases of "organic" illness, then it will also be relevant in "nonorganic" illness and ordinary action. ;By examining the intellectual development of Sigmund Freud, who began his career as a neuroscientist but later shifted into psychology, we may discover reasons for retaining psychology that are relevant today. This is the main strategy I use to impugn Churchland's theory. Along the way, I describe cases where integrated psychological and neurological explanations are not only acceptable but quite cogent. I conclude that eliminative materialism is a form of scientism that overvalues mechanistic explanation and restricts the interdisciplinary flexibility that clinicians can effectively use in treating patients suffering from some of the most challenging mental disorders.