Health care providers are expected both to relieve pain and to provide anticipatory guidance regarding how much a procedure is going to hurt. Fulfilling those expectations is complicated by the cognitive modulation of pain perception. Warning people to expect pain or setting expectations for pain relief not only influences their subjective experience, but it also alters how nociceptive stimuli are processed throughout the sensory and discriminative pathways in the brain. In light of this, I reconsider the characterization of placebo analgesia (...) as pharmacologically inert and the use of it as deceptive. I show that placebo analgesia exploits the same physical mechanisms as proven analgesics and argue that it should be utilized to relieve pain. Additionally, I describe factors to help identify situations in which clinicians have the obligation to disclose the potential for pain coupled with ways of mitigating the risk of high-intensity pain by setting positive expectations. (shrink)
To cause pain, it is not enough to deliver a dose of noxious stimulation. Pain requires the interaction of sensory processing, emotion, and cognition. In this paper, I focus on the role of cognition in the felt intensity of pain. I provide evidence for the cognitive modulation of pain. In particular, I show that attention and expectation can influence the experience of pain intensity. I also consider the mechanisms that underlie the cognitive effects on pain. I show that all the (...) proposed mechanisms of pain modulation affirm the view that cognition impacts the sensory and discriminative aspects of pain. I conclude that pain perception is a cognitively penetrated phenomenon. (shrink)
Human microbiome research has revealed that legions of bacteria, viruses, and fungi live on our skin and within the cavities of our bodies. New knowledge from these recent studies shows that humans are superorganisms and that the microbiome is indispensible to our lives and our health. This volume explores some of the science on the human microbiome and considers the ethical, legal, and social concerns that are raised by this research.
In 1959 two French neurologists, Pierre Mollaret and Maurice Goullon, coined the term coma dépassé to designate a state beyond coma. In this state, patients are not only permanently unconscious; they lack the endogenous drive to breathe, as well as brainstem reflexes, indicating that most of their brain has ceased to function. Although legally recognized in many countries as a criterion for death, brain death has not been universally accepted by bioethicists, by the medical community, or by the public. I (...) this paper, I defend brain death as a biological concept. I challenge two assumptions in the brain death literature that have shaped the debate and have stood in the way of an argument for brain death as biological. First, I challenge the dualism established in the debate between the body and the brain. Second, I contest the emphasis on consciousness, which prevents the inclusion of psychological phenomena into a biological criterion of death. I propose that the term organism should apply both to the functioning of the body and the brain. I argue that the cessation of the organism as a whole should take into account three elements of integrated function. Those three elements are: 1) the loss of integrated bodily function; 2) the loss of psychophysical integration required for processing of external stimuli and those required for behavior; and, 3) the loss of integrated psychological function, such as memory, learning, attention, and so forth. The loss of those three elements of integrated function is death. (shrink)
In this article, we focus on the definition and application of the sliding scale of capacity. We show that the current interpretations of the sliding scale confound distinct features of the medical decision, such as its urgency, its severity, or its complexity, that do not always covary.We propose that the threshold for assessing capacity should be adjusted based solely on the cognitive complexity of the decision at hand. We further suggest that the complexity of a decision should be identified based (...) on a patient’s particular cognitive deficits. We utilize the current research on the types of deficits that characterize amnestic dementias and examine which types of medical decisions might be most complex for patients with that type of dementia. We conclude that applying the sliding scale based on individualized judgments of cognitive complexity will improve accuracy of assessment of capacity and enable capable patients to participate in medical decision making. (shrink)
Neuroethics is an emerging interdisciplinary field with unsettled boundaries. Many of the ethical issues within the purview of neuroethics could be described as resulting from the clash between the scientific perspective on concepts such as free will, personal identity, consciousness, etc., and the putatively commonsense conceptions of those terms. The assumption that undergirds the framing of the conflict between these two approaches is that advances in neuroscience, psychiatry, and psychology can be used to explain phenomena covered by commonsense concepts and (...) in some cases undermine them entirely. This book is focused on the examination of the particular relationship between developments in neuroscience and commonsense moral concepts. Common sense, I argue, has been misinterpreted as a static, either foundational or degenerative, basis of our morality, when it is an ever shifting repository of theories from many domains. Within this discussion, I focus on the application of neuroscience to human beings, i.e., the ethics of neuroscience. But I also cover issues within the purview of the neuroscience of ethics, and attempt to address the infiltration of neuroscientific knowledge into everyday parlance and the impact of that on our commonsense morality and psychology. (shrink)
Unrepresented patients are individuals who lack decision makingcapacity and have no family or friends to make medical decisions for them. This population is growing in number in the United States, particularly within emergency and intensive care settings. While some bioethical discussion has taken place in response to the question of who ought to make decisions for these patients, the issue of how surrogate medical decisions ought to be made for this population remains unexplored. In this paper, we argue that standard (...) applications of surrogate decision making principles in health care are not well suited to many unrepresented patients with long-term mental health diagnosis. We argue that when applied to this population, the substituted judgment standard, designed to preserve patient preferences and values, may lead to the exclusion of their preferences. We argue further that the application of the best interest standard runs the risk of leading to harmful cases of overtreatment or undertreatment. We offer an alternative interpretation of the best interest principle that is better able to promote the well-being of unrepresented patients, especially for those who lack capacity because of mental disorders. This alternative is based on the practices and principles of harm reduction and includes three components: emphasis on considering the expressed preferences of unrepresented patients, a focus on reducing harm as well as the delivery of clinical benefits, and a recognition of the importance of promoting trust. (shrink)
Confidentiality of health information is increasingly relevant in the era of electronic medical records. We discuss the case of a hospitalized patient who requested a neurology consultation for an episode he described as an “LSD-like” flashback. The patient expressed concern that the episode was a residual effect of past drug use, but subsequently requested that his drug use not be documented. Involved in a custody battle, he feared that if his records were released to the court he could lose custody (...) of his children. Ethical concerns arose with regards to the physician’s competing obligations with a duty to record information accurately and honestly, respect patient autonomy, and maintain patient confidentiality. We discuss the decision of the team to document the patient’s drug use by arguing that the obligation to maintain confidentiality did not supersede the primary role of the medical record as a complete and accurate account, which cannot be altered at a patient’s behest. (shrink)
Upon entering the examination room, Caitlyn encounters a woman sitting alone and in distress. Caitlyn introduces herself as the hospital ethicist and tells the woman, Mrs. Dennis, that her aim is to help her reach a decision about whether to perform an autopsy on her recently deceased husband. Mrs. Dennis begins the encounter by telling the ethicist that she has to decide quickly, but that she is very torn about what to do. Mrs. Dennis adds, “My sons disagree about the (...) autopsy.” As a standardized patient, a specialized actor, the woman playing Mrs. Dennis has already delivered the same opening lines several times to different learners practicing their clinical ethics consultation skills. An SP encounter is a simulated patient encounter used for educational purposes that requires the standardization of verbal and behavioral responses. In the encounter, the simulator, or “patient,” uses a scripted medical history to enable the learner to employ a certain skill, say, the ability to perform a neurological exam. The use of standardized patients in the evaluation of clinical skills has become a staple in medical education. To tackle the challenge of teaching clinical ethics consultation skills, we have incorporated SP encounters into the curriculum of the Bioethics Program of The Union Graduate College and the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai. SP encounters are incorporated into one of our onsite classes, the Onsite Clinical Ethics Practicum, and they are part of the capstone examination, which all of our graduates must complete successfully. The inclusion of simulated encounters into the curriculum is one way in which we equip our students with the core competencies specified by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities Task Force for clinical ethicists. (shrink)
Racial disparities in pain treatment are well documented. Such disparities are explained with reference to factors related to providers, health care structures, and patient behaviors. Racial differences in pain experiences, although well documented, are less well understood. Explanations for such differences usually involve genetic or psychological factors. Here, we argue that racial differences in pain experiences might also be explained by disparities in pain treatment. Based on what we know about the nature of pain, particularly the cognitive and affective aspects (...) of the phenomenon, it is likely that disparities in the treatment of racialized patients can lead to significant racial differences in pain experience that show up at the population level. We argue that the failure of research programs to consider this causal factor is an example of white ignorance. We also consider several implications of the link between racial disparities in pain treatment and racial differences in pain experience. (shrink)
Loss of personal identity in dementia can raise a number of ethical considerations, including the applicability of advance directives and the validity of patient preferences that seem incongruous with a previous history of values. In this chapter, we first endorse the self-concept view as the most appropriate approach to personal continuity in healthcare. We briefly describe two different types of dementia, Alzheimer’s dementia (AD) and behavioral-variant frontotemporal dementia (bv-FTD). We identify elements considered important for the continuation of a self-concept, including (...) continuation of memories, consistency in personality traits and personal preferences, and continued endorsement of certain moral tenets. We show that, depending on which element is considered most important for personal identity, continuity of a self-concept for individuals with distinct types of dementia will be affected and assessed differently. Utilizing a variety of empirical evidence, we argue that persistence of memory, personality traits, and preferences are not the most important for the maintenance of personal identity. Instead, as studies aimed to capture the folk-psychological view of personal continuity demonstrate, judgements about continuity depend primarily on the persistent commitment to widely shared moral beliefs. Because of that, we argue that individuals with bv-FTD are more likely to lose their sense of self than individuals whose dementia primarily affects memory, such as Alzheimer’s disease. We end the chapter by showing how the importance of moral beliefs for continuity of self can be used to provide guidance to health-care professionals when considering changes in preference by individuals with dementia. (shrink)
The established two tracks of neuroenhancement, moral and cognitive enhancements, rest on the characterization of commonsense morality as a set of static psychological dispositions. In this paper, I challenge this way of describing commonsense morality. I draw a parallel between commonsense psychology and commonsense morality, and I propose that the right way to characterize commonsense morality is as an empirically evaluable theory, with a structure similar to a scientific theory. I argue further that psychological dispositions to react in certain ways (...) require the tacit endorsement of a commonsense moral theory. By adopting this view, I argue that the way to change our psychological dispositions is by changing the background theory that produces them. I conclude that when commonsense morality is construed as an empirically evaluable theory, the cleft between the abilities that support scientific progress and the abilities that promote moral progress closes and it becomes evident that the way to promote both types of advancements is through cognitive enhancement. (shrink)
The purpose of this essay is to examine some of the ethical concerns raised regarding the use of neuroenhancers. Authors such as Fukuyama and Sandel argue that medical intervention should be limited to treatment of disease, and that enhancement should be outside of the scope of medicine. This commentary will examine the distinction between treatment and enhancement. I shall conclude that it is not a well-drawn distinction and should not be used to provide guidance with regards to the use of (...) psychopharmacological agents for the purpose of cognitive enhancement. I shall further examine whether concepts such as disability and normality could provide a criterion for determining whether enhancement is a permissible use of medical intervention. I conclude that as those concepts are contextually defined, they cannot be used to make principled arguments against enhancement. Finally, I shall review the charge that medicalization of cognitive performance enhancers is not morally permissible. I shall argue that medicalization might have both negative and positive consequences, and decisions about the moral permissibility of medicalization should be made on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)
There are currently two legally established criteria for death: the irreversible cessation of circulation and respiration and the irreversible cessation of neurologic function. Recently there have been technological developments that could undermine the irreversibility requirement. In this paper, I focus both on whether death should be identified as an irreversible state and on the proper scope of irreversibility in the biological definition of death. In section two of this paper, I tackle the distinction between the commonsense definition of death and (...) the biological definition of death to show that even the commonsense concept of death is specified by biological facts. Resting on this argument, in section three of the paper, I argue that any definition of death is a posteriori. Thus, irreversibility is part of any definition of death because the actual phenomenon of death is irreversible. In addition, I show that the proper domain of irreversibility in a definition of death is circumscribed by physical possibilities and that irreversibility in the definition of death refers to current possibilities for the reversal of relevant biological processes. I conclude that despite recent technological advancements, death is still irreversible. (shrink)
It is one of the premises of eliminative materialism that commonsense psychology constitutes a theory. There is agreement that mental states can be construed as posited entities for the explanation and prediction of behavior. Disputes arise when it comes to the range of the commonsense theory of mental states. In chapter one, I review major arguments concerning the span and nature of folk psychology. In chapter two, relying on arguments by Quine and Sellars, I argue that the precise scope of (...) commonsense psychology cannot be determined because there are no resources to distinguish claims that are commonsense from all others. I use this conclusion to evaluate Churchland’s proposal that folk psychology should be eliminated in favor of a scientific theory. I argue that, although such an elimination is possible, it is unnecessary because commonsense psychology is in part informed by scientific theories. The properties that are usually attributed to mental states, on my view, are not common sense and would re-emerge even if we replaced our current theory with a scientific one. In chapter three, I examine how this affects eliminativist arguments, such as Churchland’s proposals for how to solve the emergence of the phenomenal character of sensations. I argue that it might be the case that some phenomenal properties are the result of endorsing a particular theory, but phenomenal character as such is a permanent feature of any theory about internal states. Addressing the problem of the incorrigibility of mental states, in chapter four, I challenge Rorty’s idea that such a property is the mark of the mental and can be attributed to our mental states based on our everyday usage of mental terms. The position asserted in the dissertation is compatible with the view that any theory can be revised, but doubts are expressed concerning the likelihood for a complete replacement of the current folk-psychological theory. Taking inspiration form Sellars, in chapter five, I argue that the establishment of a conceptual framework entails a wholistic jump from no concepts to a rudimentary framework. With this leap some properties are solidified and stand in the way of elimination. (shrink)
Endorsing the view that commonsense conceptions are shaped by scientific claims provides an explanation for why microbiota-gut-brain research might become incorporated into commonsense notions of health. But scientific claims also shape notions of personal identity, which accounts for why they can become entrenched in common sense even after they have been refuted by science.
In this article, we focus on the definition and application of the sliding scale of capacity. We show that the current interpretations of the sliding scale confound distinct features of the medical decision, such as its urgency, its severity, or its complexity, that do not always covary. We propose that the threshold for assessing capacity should be adjusted based solely on the cognitive complexity of the decision at hand. We further suggest that the complexity of a decision should be identified (...) based on a patient’s particular cognitive deficits. We utilize the current research on the types of deficits that characterize amnestic dementias and examine which types of medical decisions might be most complex for patients with that type of dementia. We conclude that applying the sliding scale based on individualized judgments of cognitive complexity will improve accuracy of assessment of capacity and enable capable patients to participate in medical decision making. (shrink)