Necessity and Deliberation: An Argument from De Interpretatione 9

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):289 - 306 (1987)
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Abstract

In De Interpretatione 9 Aristotle considers the proposition that everything that is or comes to be, is or comes to be of necessity. From the supposition that this is so, he draws the following consequence: ‘[In that case] there would be no need to deliberate or take trouble, [saying] that if we do this there will be so and so, and if we do not do this there will not be so and so’. Finding this result absurd, he rejects the supposition and concludes that some events or states of affairs are contingent.

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Sarah Broadie
Last affiliation: University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Aristotle’s Uses of ἕνεκα.Takashi Oki - 2021 - Phronesis 67 (1):1-26.

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References found in this work

Ancient skepticism and causation.Jonathan Barnes - 1983 - In Myles Burnyeat (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition. University of California Press. pp. 149--203.

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