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  1. The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno’s Paradox from Socrates to Sextus.Gail Fine - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus Gail Fine. sense that they consider the issues it raises; and they argue, against its conclusion, that inquiry is possible. Like Plato and Aristotle, they also explain what makes inquiry possible; and they do ...
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  2. Plato on knowledge and forms: selected essays.Gail Fine - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Plato on Knowledge and Forms brings together a set of connected essays by Gail Fine, in her main area of research since the late 1970s: Plato's metaphysics and epistemology. She discusses central issues in Plato's metaphysics and epistemology, issues concerning the nature and extent of knowledge, and its relation to perception, sensibles, and forms; and issues concerning the nature of forms, such as whether they are universals or particulars, separate or immanent, and whether they are causes. A specially written introduction (...)
  3. On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms.Gail Fine - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The Peri ide^on is the only work in which Aristotle systematically sets out and criticizes arguments for the existence of Platonic forms. Gail Fine presents the first full-length treatment in English of this important but neglected work. She asks how, and how well, Aristotle understands Plato's theory of forms, and why and with what justification he favors an alternative metaphysical scheme. She examines the significance of the Peri ide^on for some central questions about Plato's theory of forms--whether, for example, there (...)
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  4. Separation.Gail Fine - 1984 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2:31-87.
  5. Inquiry in the Meno.Gail Fine - 1992 - In Richard Kraut (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 200-226.
    In most of the Socratic dialogues, Socrates professes to inquire into some virtue. At the same time, he professes not to know what the virtue in question is. How, then, can he inquire into it? Doesn't he need some knowledge to guide his inquiry? Socrates' disclaimer of knowledge seems to preclude Socratic inquiry. This difficulty must confront any reader of the Socratic dialogues; but one searches them in vain for any explicit statement of the problem or for any explicit solution (...)
     
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  6. (2 other versions)Knowledge and Belief in Republic V.Gail Fine - 1978 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60 (2):121-39.
  7. Forms as causes: Plato and Aristotle.Gail Fine - 1987 - In A. Graeser (ed.), Mathematik und Metaphysik bei Aristoteles. Haupt.
  8. (1 other version)Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno.Gail Fine - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 27:41-81.
  9. On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms.Gail Fine - 1994 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 99 (3):406-408.
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  10. Knowledge and logos in the theaetetus.Gail J. Fine - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (3):366-397.
  11.  35
    Essays in Ancient Epistemology.Gail Fine - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume draws together a series of thirteen essays on ancient epistemology by Gail Fine. She discusses knowledge, belief, subjectivity, and scepticism in Plato, Aristotle, and the Pyrrhonian sceptics. They consider such questions as: is episteme knowledge? Is doxa belief? Do the ancientshave the notion of subjectivity? Do any of them countenance external world scepticism? Several essays compare these philosophers with one another, as well as with more recent discussions of knowledge, belief, subjectivity, and scepticism, asking how if at all (...)
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  12.  36
    Aristotle: Selections.Gail Fine - 1955 - Hackett Publishing Company.
    Selections seeks to provide an accurate and readable translation that will allow the reader to follow Aristotle's use of crucial technical terms and to grasp the details of his argument. Unlike anthologies that combine translations by many hands, this volume includes a fully integrated set of translations by a two-person team. The glossary--the most detailed in any edition--explains Aristotle's vocabulary and indicates the correspondences between Greek and English words. Brief notes supply alternative translations and elucidate difficult passages.
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  13. (1 other version)Does Socrates Claim to KNow that He Knows Nothing?Gail Fine - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 35:49-85.
     
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  14. (1 other version)The Oxford Handbook of Plato.Gail Fine (ed.) - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Plato is the best known, and continues to be the most widely studied, of all the ancient Greek philosophers. The twenty-one commissioned articles in The Oxford Handbook of Plato provide in-depth and up-to-date discussions of a variety of topics and dialogues. The result is a useful state-of-the-art reference to the man many consider the most important philosophical thinker in history.
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  15.  53
    Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays.Gail Fine - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):504-506.
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  16. Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage?Gail Fine - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):195.
    Lately, several commentators have argued that there are significant differences between ancient and modern skepticism. For example, it has been argued that ancient skeptics disavow belief, whereas the moderns disavow only knowledge. It has also been argued that the scope of ancient skepticism is considerably less radical than that of modern skepticism: unlike the moderns, the ancients do not question whether they have bodies or whether there is an external world furnished with the sorts of objects we generally take there (...)
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  17. Immanence.Gail Fine - 1986 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 4:71-97.
     
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  18. Separation: A Reply to Morrison.Gail Fine - 1985 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3:159-65.
  19. (1 other version)Plato on naming.Gail Fine - 1977 - Philosophical Quarterly 27 (109):289-301.
  20. The ‘Two Worlds’ Theory in the Phaedo.Gail Fine - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (4):557-572.
    ABSTRACTAt least in some dialogues, Plato has been thought to hold the so-called Two Worlds Theory, according to which there can be belief but not knowledge about sensibles, and knowledge but not belief about forms. The Phaedo is one such dialogue. In this paper, I explore some key passages that might be thought to support TW, and ask whether they in fact do so. I also consider the related issue of whether the Phaedo argues that, if knowledge is possible at (...)
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  21.  74
    Truth and Necessity in De Interpretatione 9.Gail Fine - 1984 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):23 - 47.
  22. Substance and Separation in Aristotle.Gail Fine & Lynne Spellman - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):527.
    Spellman argues that Aristotle developed his views about substance in response to Plato’s theory of forms. In particular, she argues that Aristotelian substances are as much like Platonic forms as possible, minus the latter’s separation. Whether ASs are like PFs depends, of course, not only on what one takes ASs to be like, but also on what one takes PFs to be like; accordingly, Spellman provides accounts of both. She argues that ASs are what she calls specimens of natural kinds. (...)
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  23. Aristotle on Knowledge.Gail Fine - unknown
  24. Protagorean Relativisms.Gail Fine - 1994 - Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 10:211-43.
     
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  25.  35
    Brill Online Books and Journals.Gail Fine, Francisco J. Gonzalez, Verity Harte, Tim O'Keefe, Tad Brennan, T. H. Irwin & Bob Sharples - 1996 - Phronesis 41 (3):245-275.
  26.  70
    Plato on the Grades of Perception: Theaetetus 184–186 and the Phaedo.Gail Fine - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 53.
  27. The one over many.Gail Fine - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (2):197-240.
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  28. False Belief in the "Theaetetus".Gail Fine - 1979 - Phronesis 24 (1):70 - 80.
  29.  76
    Enquiry and Discovery: A Discussion of Dominic Scott's Plato's Meno.Gail Fine - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 32:331-367.
  30.  50
    The Development of Plato's Metaphysics.Gail Fine - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):143.
  31.  19
    Plato.Gail Fine (ed.) - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    This series aims to bring together important recent writing in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources. The editor of each volume contributes an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading.
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  32. Plato's Refutation of Protagoras in the Theaetetus.Gail Fine - 1998 - Apeiron 31 (3):201-34.
  33.  13
    Introduction.Gail Fine - 1999 - In Plato, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
  34.  39
    Relational Entities.Gail Fine - 1983 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (3):225-49.
  35.  84
    Subjectivity, Ancient and Modern: The Cyrenaics, Sextus, and Descartes.Gail Fine - 2003 - In Jon Miller & Brad Inwood (eds.), Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  36. (1 other version)Sextus and External World Skepticism.Gail Fine - 2003 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24:341-85.
  37. Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul.Gail Fine (ed.) - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume in the Oxford Readings in Philosophy looks at central areas in Plato's philosophy: ethics, politics, religion, and the soul. It includes essays on virtue, knowledge, and happiness; justice and happiness; pleasure; Platonic love; feminism; the ideally just state, democracy and totalitarianism; and the nature of the soul and moral motivation.
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  38.  80
    Skeptical Dogmata: Outlines of Pyrrhonism.Gail Fine - 2000 - Méthexis 13 (1):81-105.
  39. (1 other version)Sceptical Enquiry.Gail Fine - 2010 - In David Charles (ed.), Definition in Greek philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  40.  95
    The Object of Thought Argument: Forms and Thoughts.Gail Fine - 1988 - Apeiron 21 (3):105 - 145.
  41. Signification, Essence, and Meno’s Paradox: A Reply to David Charles’s ‘Types of Definition in the Meno’.Gail Fine - 2010 - Phronesis 55 (2):125-152.
    According to David Charles, in the Meno Socrates fleetingly distinguishes the signification from the essence question, but, in the end, he conflates them. Doing so, Charles thinks, both leads to Meno's paradox and prevents Socrates from answering it satisfactorily. I argue that Socrates doesn't conflate the two questions, and that his reply to Meno's paradox is more satisfactory than Charles allows.
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  42. Plato and Aristotle on Form and Substance.Gail Fine - 1983 - Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 209:23-47.
  43.  17
    Colloquium 6.Gail Fine - 1994 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 10 (1):211-243.
  44.  81
    Owen, Aristotle, and the Third Man.Gail Fine - 1982 - Phronesis 27 (1):13-33.
  45. Aristotle's Two Worlds: Knowledge and Belief inPosterior Analytics 1.33.Gail Fine - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):323-346.
    At the end of Republic 5, Plato distinguishes epistêmê from doxa, knowledge from belief. In Posterior Analytics 1.33, Aristotle provides his own distinction between epistêmê and doxa. I explore his way of distinguishing them and compare it with Plato's.
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  46.  35
    Signification, Essence, and Meno’s Paradox: A Reply to David Charles’s ‘Types of Definition in the Meno’.Gail Fine - 2010 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 55 (2):125-152.
  47. Plato, Volume 2: Ethics, Politics, Religious and the Soul.Gail Fine (ed.) - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    This series aims to bring together important recent writing in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources. The editor of each volume contributes an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading.
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  48. Conflicting Appearances: Theaetetus 153d-154b.Gail Fine - 1996 - In Christopher Gill & Mary Margaret McCabe (eds.), Form and Argument in Late Plato. New York: Oxford University Press.
  49. Plato on Perception: A Reply to Professor Turnbull,“Becoming and Intelligibility”.Gail Fine - 1988 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy:15-28.
  50.  10
    An Epistemic Troika.Gail Fine - 2021 - Méthexis 33 (1):32-56.
    In a characteristically stimulating and important paper, ‘Episteme’, Myles Burnyeat discusses what he calls the epistemic troika, which consists of knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge that, and knowledge how. He argues that the troika ‘lacks universal validity’; he ‘suspects’ that it is the product of Anglophone philosophy in the 1950s-early 1970s. He also challenges the philosophical value of the troika. In my paper, I explore the troika, both in its own right and as a guide to Plato’s epistemology; I also assess (...)
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