Abstract

This article compares classical (or -like) and nonclassical (or -like) axiomatisations of the fixed-point semantics developed by Kripke (J Philos 72(19): 690–716, 1975). Following the line of investigation of Halbach and Nicolai (J Philos Logic 47(2): 227–257, 2018), we do not compare and qua theories of truth simpliciter, but rather qua axiomatisations of the Kripkean conception of truth. We strengthen the central results of Halbach and Nicolai (2018) and Nicolai (Stud Log 106(1): 101–130, 2018), showing that, on the one hand, there is a stronger sense in which some variants of and some variants of can be taken to be, truth-theoretically, equivalent. On the other hand, we show that this truth-theoretical equivalence is not preserved by some other variants of and, arguing that the variants are more adequate axiomatisations of the fixed-point semantics than the corresponding variants.