Nominalism

In Stewart Shapiro (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 483--514 (2005)
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Abstract

Nominalism is the view that abstract mathematical objects like numbers, functions, and sets do not exist. The chapter articulates and defends a variety of nominalism, based on a reading of mathematical statements in terms of possible linguistic constructions. The chapter responds directly to a recent study of nominalism by Gideon Rosen and John Burgess, and develops a reply to the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects.

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