Authors
Mark Coeckelbergh
University of Vienna
David Gunkel
Northern Illinois University
Abstract
In this essay we reflect critically on how animal ethics, and in particular thinking about moral standing, is currently configured. Starting from the work of two influential “analytic” thinkers in this field, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, we examine some basic assumptions shared by these positions and demonstrate their conceptual failings—ones that have, despite efforts to the contrary, the general effect of marginalizing and excluding others. Inspired by the so-called “continental” philosophical tradition , we then argue that what is needed is a change in the rules of the game, a change of the question. We alter the normative question from “What properties does the animal have?” to “What are the conditions under which an entity becomes a moral subject?” This leads us to consider the role of language, personal relations, and material-technological contexts. What is needed then in response to the moral standing problem, is not more of the same—yet another, more refined criterion and argumentation concerning moral standing, or a “final” rational argumentation that would be able to settle the animal question once and for all—but a turning or transformation in both our thinking about and our relations to animals, through language, through technology, and through the various place-ordering practices in which we participate
Keywords Animal ethics  Moral standing  Levinas  Moral language  Technology  Place
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10806-013-9486-3
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,593
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Animal Liberation.Peter Singer (ed.) - 1977 - Avon Books.
The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Noûs. Oxford University Press. pp. 425-434.
Totality and Infinity.Emmanuel Levinas - 1961/1969 - Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Welcoming Robots Into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism.John Danaher - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2023-2049.
The Other Question: Can and Should Robots Have Rights?David J. Gunkel - 2018 - Ethics and Information Technology 20 (2):87-99.
A Dynamic Stakeholder Model: An Other‐Oriented Ethical Approach.Akram Hatami & Naser Firoozi - 2019 - Business Ethics: A European Review 28 (3):349-360.
Animal Killing and Postdomestic Meat Production.Istvan Praet & Frédéric Leroy - 2017 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30 (1):67-86.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Biocentric Ethics and Animal Prosperity.A. T. Anchustegui - 2005 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (1):105-119.
A Vindication of the Rights of Machines.David J. Gunkel - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):113-132.
The Failure of Theories of Personhood.Tom L. Beauchamp - 1999 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4):309-324.
Thinking Otherwise: Ethics, Technology and Other Subjects.David J. Gunkel - 2007 - Ethics and Information Technology 9 (3):165-177.
Levinas and Our Moral Responsibility Toward Other Animals.Peter Atterton - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (6):633 - 649.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-01-28

Total views
82 ( #118,093 of 2,385,743 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #48,297 of 2,385,743 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes