Desgabets as a cartesian empiricist

Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):pp. 501-515 (2008)
Abstract
A long tradition regards Robert Desgabets as a Cartesian empiricist. He says things that sound strikingly like Locke, and he argues against anti-empiricist reasoning in Descartes, Malebranche, and Arnauld. Moreover, throughout his writings he endorses the empiricist principle that nothing is in the intellect except what was previously in the senses. Since the Cartesians are generally supposed to be prototypical non -empiricists, Desgabets’s being a Cartesian empiricist would make him a particularly interesting specimen. In this paper, however, I challenge the case for taking Desgabets to be an empiricist.
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DOI 10.1353/hph.0.0068
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