Abstract

But the argument goes just as readily in the other direction. If agreement about language would entail philosophical agreement, then philosophical disagreement must entail disagreement about language. It is true, of course, that a discussion which is explicitly concerned with language may apparently achieve greater clarity and precision than one which is frankly and avowedly about substance and existence, universals and particulars, or the other traditional items of philosophical controversy. But until the implications of language theories for philosophical problems are laid bare, nothing of strictly philosophical interest is accomplished. And when it is seen what philosophical theses do follow as consequences of alternative theories about language, the apparent gain in clarity may turn out to be merely apparent. In other words, when we seriously address ourselves to the solution of linguistic problems, we must bring to bear on them not just a packet of new utensils especially fabricated for that purpose, but all the old techniques of philosophical inquiry--those traditionally used by the great philosophers. There is a dialectic involved here: if facts about language can and must be utilized to acquire philosophical truths, it is no less the case that philosophical truths must and can be used to discover the facts about language.