The Churchlands' war on qualia

In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case For Qualia. The MIT Press. pp. 203 (2008)
Authors
Mark Crooks
Michigan State University
Abstract
The systematic phenomenology-denial within the works of Paul and Patricia Churchland is critiqued as to its coherence with the known elelmentary physics and physiology of perception. Paul Churchland misidentifies "qualia" with psychology's sensorimotor schemas, while Patricia Churchland illicitly propounds the intertheoretic identities of logical empiricism while rejecting the premises upon which those identities are based. Their analogies from such arguments to an identity of mind and brain thus have no inductive probability.
Keywords qualia  reductionism  eliminative materialism
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