Abstract

The ostensive definition, based on ostensiveness, aims to indicate that human language is based only on gesture and indication. In this sense, such linguistic theory largely excludes the considerable eminence of symbology and internalization inscribed in the dynamics and interiority inherent to human language. Thus, the ostensible definition, with the intention of being a paradigmatic thesis about human language, would not explain or synthesize in itself all the richness present in human language. Before that, or this article intends to reflect on the ambiguity of the ostensive definition and the convergence between Wittgenstein and Augustine. Both, temporarily distant, do not endorse the ostensible definition as the basis of their theses about human language. Also, first, a concept about the ostensive definition will be presented. Deepen Wittgenstein's critique of such a linguistic concept and, finally, consider that Augustine did not have an ostensible definition as the basis of his conception of language.