Philosophical Review 106 (3):441-443 (1997)

Authors
Marian David
University of Graz
Abstract
Schmitt allots a chapter to each of the main types of theories about truth: pragmatism, coherentism, deflationism, and the correspondence theory. He discusses various arguments for these positions and concludes that only the arguments supporting the correspondence theory are successful. Schmitt's positive case for correspondence makes up the least original part of the book. He explicitly credits Field and remarks that he is mainly concerned with making Field's difficult account more accessible —a task that he discharges honorably..) Schmitt also offers detailed discussions of about fifteen negative arguments aimed against pragmatism, coherentism, and deflationism. He finds most of them effective, with the result that the correspondence theory emerges as the only tenable account of truth. He discusses some objections but seems somewhat less eager to raise problems for his own view than for its competitors.
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DOI 10.2307/2998404
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