Victimless Conduct and the Volenti Maxim: How Consent Works [Book Review]

Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (1):11-27 (2013)
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Abstract

This article examines the normative force of consent, explaining how consent works its “moral magic” in transforming the moral quality of conduct that would otherwise constitute a wrong against the consenting person. Dempsey offers an original account of the normative force of consent, according to which consent (when valid) creates an exclusionary permission . When this permission is taken up, the moral quality of the consented-to conduct is transformed, such that it no longer constitutes a wrong against the consenting person. Building on this account of how consent works, Dempsey identifies two sets of cases in which consent fails to transform the moral quality of one’s conduct: cases in which one is consent-insensitive to the rational force of another’s consent, and cases in which one acts for sadistic reasons

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Citations of this work

In defense of exclusionary reasons.N. P. Adams - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):235-253.
The Volenti Maxim.Peter Https://Orcidorg629X Schaber - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):79-89.
Consent, Rights, and Reasons for Action.Richard Healey - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):499-513.
Challenging research on human subjects: justice and uncompensated harms.Stephen Napier - 2013 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 34 (1):29-51.

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References found in this work

The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.
The morality of freedom.J. Raz - 1988 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (1):108-109.
Harm to Self.Joel Feinberg - 1986 - Oxford University Press USA.
Harm to Others.Joel Feinberg - 1984 - Oxford University Press USA.

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