Applied Ethics, Miscellaneous

Could it be that if a fetus is not a person abortion is still immoral? One affirmative answer comes in the form of ‘The Impairment Argument’, which utilizes ‘The Impairment Principle’ to argue that abortion is immoral even if fetuses lack personhood. I argue ‘The Impairment Argument’ fails. It is not adequately defended from objections, and abortion is, in fact, a counterexample to the impairment principle. Furthermore, it explains neither what the wrong-making features of abortion are nor what features of (...) fetuses ground their supposed moral significance. By presupposing the fetus lacks personhood and providing no alternate account of the basis of fetuses’ moral significance, there is nothing to constitute abortion’s wrongness. Attempts to modify it fail for the same reasons. Thus, the impairment argument fails to show abortion is immoral. (shrink)

Uncertainty replaces the conviction that rationality may be founded, ultimately. Comments on and exemplified by Zygmunt Bauman's "Intimations of postmodernity" (1992), the Quality-of-life discussion (Nussbaum & Senn (eds.) 1993) and "reflexive modernization" (Ulrich Beck, 1994). Uncertainty as a principle leads to the "imperative of responsibility" (Hans Jonas, 1984).

Normal interpersonal treatment is often based on the existence of the rational nature of both the agent and the target of the treatment, and their relationship is reciprocal and mutual. However, when the rational person confronts the irrational person, such as the mentally retarded or vegetative person, the reciprocal relationship cannot be maintained because the targeted person loses his or her rational capacity. But this inequality does not deprive the object of action of the right to be treated rationally, because (...) people treat the irrationally disabled not according to the principle of reason but according to the principle of emotion - specifically, the principle of love. The principle of love often disregards the specific conditions of the object of treatment and still treats them reasonably. Thus, the emotional principle has a broader application in interpersonal treatment. (shrink)

Drunken sex is common. Despite how common drunken sex is, we think very uncritically about it. In this paper, I want to examine whether drunk individuals can consent to sex. Specifically, I answer this question: suppose that an individual, D, who is drunk but can still engage in reasoning and communication, agrees to have sex with a sober individual, S; is D’s consent to sex with S morally valid? I will argue that, within a certain range of intoxication, an individual (...) who is drunk can give valid consent to have sex with an individual who is sober. (shrink)

El hombre moderno es un Prometeo desencadenado que se siente destinado al dominio completo de la naturaleza a la que, quiera o no, pertenece, pero respecto de la que se considera ahora superior. Para lograrlo está dispuesto a modificar su propia identidad, atreviéndose a cambios en su genética que le impidan tener enfermedades y envejecer. La ciencia encara el sueño de la eternidad.

This paper discusses various forms and sources of algorithmic discrimination. In particular, we explore the connection between – at first glance – ‘voluntary’ shar- ing or selling of one’s data on the one hand and potential risks of automated decision-making based on big data and artificial intelligence on the other. We argue that the implementation of algorithm-driven profiling or decision-making mechanisms will, in many cases, disproportionately disadvantage certain vul- nerable groups that are already disadvantaged by many existing datafication practices. We (...) call into question the voluntariness of these mechanisms, especially for certain vulnerable groups, and claim that members of such groups are often- times more likely to give away their data. If these existing datafication practices exacerbate prior disadvantages, they ‘compound historical injustices’ (Hellman, 2018) and thereby constitute forms of morally wrong discrimination. To make matters worse, they are even more prone to further algorithmic discriminations based on the additional data collected from them. (shrink)

Background. The COVID-19 pandemic necessitated drastic changes to undergraduate medical training at the University of Botswana (UB). To save the academic year when campus was locked down, the Department of Medical Education conducted a needs assessment to determine the readiness for emergency remote teaching (ERT) of the Faculty of Medicine, UB. Objectives. To report on the findings of needs assessment surveys to assess learner and teaching staff preparedness for fair and just ERT, as defined by philosopher John Rawls. Methods. Needs (...) assessment surveys were conducted using Office 365 Forms distributed via WhatsApp, targeting medical students and teaching staff during the 5 undergraduate years. Data were analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. Results. Ninety-two percent (266/289) of students and 73.5% (62/84) of teaching staff responded. Surveys revealed a high penetration of smartphones among students, but poor internet accessibility and affordability in homes. Some teaching staff also reported internet and device insufficiencies. Only WhatsApp was accessible to students and teaching staff. Conclusions. For equitable access to ERT in the future, the surveys revealed infrastructural improvement needs, including wider, stronger, affordable WiFi coverage within Botswana and enhanced digital infrastructures in educational institutions, with increased support for students. (shrink)

A COVID-19 vaccine mandate is being introduced for health and social care workers in England, and those refusing to comply will either be redeployed or have their employment terminated. We argue th...

Research Ethics, Volume 18, Issue 2, Page 163-168, April 2022. Citation is an essential practice in scientific publishing. However, it is mandatory that citing the sources in a scientific work is performed in a proper manner. Manipulating citations in research articles is one form of academic research misconduct that violates publication ethics. Citation manipulation simply occurs for the purpose of increasing the number of citations of a researcher or a journal. Unfortunately, there has been a growing trend for this type (...) of misconduct recently and this has not received much attention from the science community. The most effective solution to prevent the growth of such unethical practices is for reputable journals to impose stricter rules on reference evaluation criteria in order to emphasize on the appropriateness of the citations. (shrink)

This collection of papers builds on the idea that the bioeconomy provides a framework for potentially effective solutions addressing the grand global challenges by a turn towards an increased use of biological resources, towards renewability and circularity. Consequently, it cannot be perceived as an end in itself. Thus, innovative endeavors within this bioeconomy framework require a serious examination of their normative premises and implications. From different perspectives, the five contributions to the collection demonstrate that for a bioeconomy that is to (...) contribute to the transformation towards sustainability, inquiries into norms, values, and paradigms of innovators and other stakeholders are indispensable. Originating in the spirit of an interdisciplinary workshop on the "The Normative Dimension of Transformations towards a Sustainable Bioeconomy", the collection at hand provides an attempt to facilitate an increased commitment of social sciences into bioeconomy discourses. We learn: the bioeconomy is on the rise as it is, but whether it will guide us the way towards an equitable, environmentally sound, and future-proof economy, heavily depends on the normative guardrails imposed by science, society, and business. Recent discussions have shown that the pressing problems and complex challenges humanity is currently facing cannot be adequately tackled by approaches that. (shrink)

This study investigated Boko Haram and terrorist activities in Nigeria while looking at the ethical implications and responses of the Christians. The study was guided by two objectives which are to; analyse whether the acts of terror carried out by Boko Haram are ethical and examine the responses of the Christians with respect to Boko Haram acts of terror. However, the methods of exposition and critical analysis was used and content analysis was used to analyse data collected. Data was collected (...) from secondary sources like textbooks, journal articles, interviews, institutional materials and internet sources. The study also looked at concept of terrorism and a brief history of Boko Haram. The findings of the study showed that since Boko Haram acts of terrorism is simply a display of violence to terrify the populace and the government, it can be said that their actions and activities which include violence is unacceptable and could be termed wrong taking cognizance of the consequentialist view which opines that the morality of an action depends on its results. The ethics of care which is seen as a context-based approach to preserve relationship, negates Boko Haram acts of terror which apparently has a considerable effect on a number of relationships. The findings further showed that the Christians responded by rejecting to integrate with Muslims and also encouraged Christians to move to areas where there are major Christian settlements while others had to fall back to the natural tendency of self-preservation. (shrink)

Some stories of moral exemplars motivate us to emulate their admirable attitudes and behaviors, but why do some exemplars motivate us more than others? We systematically studied how motivation to emulate is influenced by the similarity between a reader and an exemplar in social or cultural background (Relatability) and how personally costly or demanding the exemplar’s actions are (Attainability). Study 1 found that university students reported more inspiration and related feelings after reading true stories about the good deeds of a (...) recent fellow alum, compared to a famous moral exemplar from decades past. Study 2A developed a battery of short moral exemplar stories that more systematically varied Relatability and Attainability, along with a set of non-moral exemplar stories for comparison. Studies 2B and 2C examined the path from the story type to relatively low stakes altruism (donating to charity and intentions to volunteer) through perceived attainability and relatability, as well as elevation and pleasantness. Together, our studies suggest that it is primarily the relatability of the moral exemplars, not the attainability of their actions, that inspires more prosocial motivation, at least regarding acts that help others at a relatively low cost to oneself. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that to tackle social injustice, implicit biases and unjust social structures should be targeted equally because they sustain and ontologically overlap with each other. Here I develop this thought further by relating it to the hypothesis of extended cognition. I argue that if we accept common conditions for extended cognition then people’s implicit biases are often partly realized by and so extended into unjust social structures. This supports the view that we should counteract psychological and (...) social contributors to injustice equally. But it also has a significant downside. If unjust social structures are part of people’s minds then dismantling these structures becomes more difficult than it currently is, as this will then require us to overcome widely accepted ethical and legal barriers protecting people’s bodily and personal integrity. Thus, while there are good grounds to believe that people’s biases and unjust social structures ontologically overlap, there are also strong ethical reasons to reject this view. Metaphysical and ethical intuitions about implicit bias hence collide in an important way. (shrink)

Philosophical concerns about nuclear armaments raises questions about the logical and conceptual basis for deterrence theory as well as the effects of nuclear threats on our common humanity. Most philosophical concern centers around around the morality of nuclear deterrence. It is sometimes thought that the doctrine of just war can provide a moral justification for nuclear deterrence based on threats of massive retaliation. Ye attempts to apply the doctrine of just war lead to a moral dilemma: although nuclear deterrence seems (...) justified as self-defense, there are compelling reasons for concluding that threats of retaliation are immoral. Alternative deterrence policies might be thought to overcome the moral dilemma. However, counterforce strategy and anti-missile defense, as recently proposed by President reagan, must still depend upon immoral threats of retaliation. Proposals for a nonviolent national defense offer a possible solution, and serious attention should be given to claims that nonviolent defense is relevant in the nuclear age and would deter aggression. (shrink)

In the past few years, the ethical ramifications of AI technologies have been at the center of intense debates. Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding how a morally responsible practice of data science can be promoted and which values have to shape it. In this context, ethics and moral responsibility have been mainly conceptualized as compliance to widely shared principles. However, several scholars have highlighted the limitations of such a principled approach. Drawing from microethics and the virtue theory tradition, (...) in this paper, we formulate a different approach to ethics in data science which is based on a different conception of “being ethical” and, ultimately, of what it means to promote a morally responsible data science. First, we develop the idea that, rather than only compliance, ethical decision-making consists in using certain moral abilities, which are cultivated by practicing and exercising them in the data science process. An aspect of virtue development that we discuss here is moral attention, which is the ability of data scientists to identify the ethical relevance of their own technical decisions in data science activities. Next, by elaborating on the capability approach, we define a technical act as ethically relevant when it impacts one or more of the basic human capabilities of data subjects. Therefore, rather than “applying ethics”, data scientists should cultivate ethics as a form of reflection on how technical choices and ethical impacts shape one another. Finally, we show how this microethical framework concretely works, by dissecting the ethical dimension of the technical procedures involved in data understanding and preparation of electronic health records. (shrink)

David Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

Aiming at the allocation of scarce medical resources, Immanuel and other scholars have put forward a set of influential ethical values and guiding principles. It assigns the priority of resource allocation to those whose lives can be saved and maximized, those who can bring the greatest instrumental value, and those who are the worse off. For other members of society, random selection under the same conditions is adopted. Following the Rawlsian "lexical order, lexicographical" rule, this priority arrangement requires that the (...) "utilitarian principle" should be placed before the "equality principle", and the "instrumental difference principle", the "integrity difference principle" and the "fair opportunity principle" in turn acts on specific distribution agents. Although the framework and its priority rules have obvious drawbacks when faced with Medical Resources Squeeze and other dilemmas, with the help of an understanding of its internal structure, it can effectively respond to the four core issues in the allocation of scarce medical resources. (shrink)

Are we required to assist wild animals suffering due to natural causes? The laissez-faire intuition (LFI) says that we are not. On this view, although we may have special duties to assist wild animals, there are no general requirements to care for them. In this article I critically examine the origins of the LFI and assess its reliability. In particular, I attempt to provide answers to the questions such as how people who have come to endorse this intuition form it (...) and whether it is a genuine moral intuition. I conclude that the LFI is the result of various external factors that influence and overpower people’s genuine intuitive moral judgment and for that reason it should not be trusted. (shrink)

COVID-19 vaccination of children has begun in various high-income countries with regulatory approval and general public support, but largely without careful ethical consideration. This trend is expected to extend to other COVID-19 vaccines and lower ages as clinical trials progress. This paper provides an ethical analysis of COVID-19 vaccination of healthy children. Specifically, we argue that it is currently unclear whether routine COVID-19 vaccination of healthy children is ethically justified in most contexts, given the minimal direct benefit that COVID-19 vaccination (...) provides to children, the potential for rare risks to outweigh these benefits and undermine vaccine confidence, and substantial evidence that COVID-19 vaccination confers adequate protection to risk groups, such as older adults, without the need to vaccinate healthy children. We conclude that child COVID-19 vaccination in wealthy communities before adults in poor communities worldwide is ethically unacceptable and consider how policy deliberations might evolve in light of future developments. (shrink)

It is commonplace to observe that digital technologies facilitate our access to information on a scale unimaginable in previous eras, leading many to call this the “Information Age.” The vaunted advantages of unprecedented data flow obscure a dark corollary: the more modes of engaging with data are available to a people, the more modes are available for manipulating them. Whether through social media, blogs, email, newspaper headlines, or doctored images and videos, the public is indeed bombarded by information, and much (...) of it is misleading or outright false. Much of it, in fact, is propaganda. As the methods for manipulating mass audiences continue to multiply, a clear understanding of the concept of propaganda has never been more relevant. -/- This Article constructs a precise, novel account of propaganda, incorporating notable scholarly insights into the concept as well as the overlooked lessons of the law’s fragmented efforts to regulate it. To bring this new theoretical framework into focus and demonstrate its importance in the Information Age, the Article connects the underlying theory to contemporary communications practices, many of which are enhanced by the availability of new technology. Notably, in doing so, the Article also develops the first systematic account of political gaslighting, which properly understood (and counterintuitively, perhaps) constitutes a form of propaganda. (shrink)

I examine the role played by the emotions of envy and resentment in interpersonal online dynamics during the COVID19 pandemic. I start by reviewing what we know about the interplay of social media use, social comparison and well-being, and by applying this knowledge to current circumstances. Then, I introduce some philosophical distinctions that complicate the already complex empirical evidence, differentiating, in particular, between envy and resentment, and between different kinds of envy. I argue that we can use the knowledge of (...) these distinctions to better cope with these painful, but sometimes productive and always informative, emotions. (shrink)

This paper provides a retrospective and prospective overview of TU Delft’s approach to engineering ethics education. For over twenty years, the Ethics and Philosophy of Technology Section at TU Delft has been at the forefront of engineering ethics education, offering education to a wide range of engineering and design students. The approach developed at TU Delft is deeply informed by the research of the Section, which is centered around Responsible Research and Innovation, Design for Values, and Risk Ethics. These theoretical (...) approaches are premised on the notion that technologies are inherently value-laden, and as such contain the possibility of fostering or hindering moral values. Each of these approaches encourages students to take a proactive attitude with respect to their projects and profession, thinking creatively about – and taking responsibility for – how to both prevent harm and do good via the technologies they help develop. To explain how this is put into practice, this paper sketches a brief history of ethics teaching at TU Delft, outlines current activities, and presents future plans for Bachelor and Master’s level engineering ethics education at TU Delft. (shrink)

Many people believe that our thoughts can be morally wrong. Many regard rape and murder fantasies as wrong. In a recent essay, George Sher disagrees with this and argues that “the realm of the purely mental is best regarded as a morality-free zone,” wherein “no thoughts or attitudes are either forbidden or required” (484). Sher argues that “each person’s subjectivity is a limitless, lawless wild west in which absolutely everything is permitted” (484). Sher calls this view the Wild West of (...) the Mind. -/- I argue against Sher’s position. In section I, I summarize Sher’s view. In section II, I outline and criticize Sher’s argument for the Wild West of the Mind. Sher identifies two features of the mental realm that he thinks put our thoughts beyond the scope of morality. The first feature of the mental that Sher appeals to is that rules against actions have discrete boundaries, while rules against thoughts do not. I argue that this problem is equally true of actions and thoughts, meaning that this argument fails to show how thoughts are morally different from actions. The second feature of the mental that Sher points to is that our mental lives are impermeable to and disconnected from other people, meaning that they cannot wrong others. I argue that our thoughts, despite being impermeable and disconnected, can wrong others by inflicting unfelt harms upon them. -/- In section III, I outline additional objections to Sher’s view. First, I argue that Sher’s view should actually be understood as being about the permissibly of any unheard utterance, not just about the permissibility of private thoughts. This clarification, I argue, renders his view implausible. Second, I argue that our thoughts can inflict unfelt harms on others, making them sometimes impermissible. Third, I argue that Sher’s position on thought-action composites is implausible. (shrink)

Cooperation in wrongdoing is an everyday matter for all of us, though we need to discern when such cooperation is morally excluded as constituting formal cooperation, as opposed to material (unintended) cooperation whether justified or otherwise. In this paper, I offer examples of formal cooperation such as referral of patients for certain procedures where the cooperating doctor intends an intrinsically wrongful plan of action on the part of the patient and a medical colleague. I also consider a case of formal (...) cooperation where the cooperator intends a choice on the part of another person that is not intrinsically wrong, but wrong in the circumstances because the person believes it will cause serious uncompensated harm. (shrink)

Scholars, journalists, and activists working on climate change often distinguish between “individual” and “structural” approaches to decarbonization. The former concern choices individuals can make to reduce their “personal carbon footprint” (e.g., eating less meat). The latter concern changes to institutions, laws, and other social structures. These two approaches are often framed as oppositional, representing a mutually exclusive forced choice between alternative routes to decarbonization. After presenting representative samples of this oppositional framing of individual and structural approaches in environmental communication, we (...) identify four problems with oppositional thinking and propose five ways to conceive of individual and structural reform as symbiotic and interdependent. (shrink)

It is a relatively uncontroversial proposition that without “ethics,” an “ethics of homelessness” is impossible. What is less uncontroversial, though, is that philosophy—or at least philosophical analysis—is a necessary condition of ethical discourse. The distrust—or skepticism regarding the utility of— philosophical analysis is predicated on rendering philosophy as useless. This, though, should create a sense of cognitive dissonance, since we universally acknowledge that ethics informs how we interact with ourselves and others, while we also accept, and rightly so, the uselessness (...) of philosophy. While pop- ular parlance has it that uselessness is logically and semantically equivalent to not needed or conceptually irrelevant, this, I will argue, is mistaken. This mis- take, as I see it, is a result of the failure to recognize that liberal arts are intrinsi- cally useless—and ought to be treated as such. To mend this mistake, I will outline the liberal arts in contrast to the servile arts and explain how Aristotle, and his later defender Josef Pieper, correctly understood the distinction. I will then move onto suggest that while philosophy—as a liberal art—is useless, and rightfully so, it is a conceptually relevant, necessary condition for dealing with conceptual problems which arise in ethics—and therefore in the ethics of homelessness. To explicate and defend this thesis, I argue that Plato’s three- fold division of goods, originating in Book ii of his Republic, helps to amalgamate our reservations in accepting philosophy as useless—strictly speaking—and simultaneously useful. From this, I move on to provide various ways in which philosophy is relevant to questions of home and homelessness generally, and display how philosophers themselves have, historically, taken seriously the question of home and homelessness as serious philosophical concepts. Finally, I outline how philosophers can work on the ethics of home- lessness by taking seriously the necessary presuppositions which make work- ing on the alleviation of homelessness not merely possible, but morally obligatory. Having sketched a broad picture of how philosophy interacts with the practical problems of homelessness, I conclude that progress in the field of the ethics of homelessness—as a conceptual endeavor—will ultimately arise from overcoming our prima facie interpretation of the liberal/servile arts distinction and thereby preserve its original meaning. (shrink)

Der Beitrag geht davon aus, dass es die immer stärkere Ausweitung von Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung öffentlicher Sicherheit durch den Staat notwendig macht, sich innerhalb der philosophischen Ethik dezidiert mit dem Feld der öffentlichen Sicherheit zu befassen. Von der Zielvorstellung her, wissenschaftliche Politikberatung leisten und gesellschaftliche Debatten strukturierend unterstützen zu können, entwickelt Volkmann dabei in seinem Aufsatz eine Reihe von bereichsbezogenen sowie anwendungsbezogenen Anforderungen, die eine solche angewandte Ethik für öffentliche Sicherheit inhaltlich und methodisch einlösen können muss.

Die Frage nach der Verantwortung für globale Armut laesst sich auf mindestens zwei Weisen stellen – als Frage nach der (retrospektiven) Verantwortung für das Auftreten dieses Problems oder als Frage nach der (prospektiven) Verantwortung für dessen Behebung. Dieses Kapitel wird sich vor allem auf die zweite Frage konzentrieren: Inwiefern sollte die Verantwortung, Armut zu bekaempfen, als kollektive Verantwortung verstanden werden? Für viele von uns werden diese Pflichten nur im weiten (schwachen) Sinne kollektiv sein, naemlich in dem Sinne, dass die kollektive (...) Ebene für die Entscheidungsfindung und die Handlungsbewertung primaer ist. Kollektivitaet von Verantwortung im engen Sinn erfordert hingegen staerkere epistemische Verknüpfungen der Gruppenmitglieder sowie eine Bekenntnis zum gemeinsamen Ziel. Wo diese bereits bestehen, da koennen wir von kollektiver Verantwortung in diesem starken Sinn sprechen und entsprechend von den Mitgliedern dieser Gruppen einen groesseren Einsatz für das Endresultat erwarten. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend three claims about what it will take for an AI system to be a basic moral patient to whom we can owe duties of non-maleficence not to harm her and duties of beneficence to benefit her: (1) Moral patients are mental patients; (2) Mental patients are true intentional systems; and (3) True intentional systems are systematically flexible. We suggest that we should be particularly alert to the possibility of such systematically flexible true intentional systems developing (...) in the areas of exploratory robots and artificial personal assistants. Finally, we argue that in light of our failure to respect the well-being of existing biological moral patients and worries about our limited resources, there are compelling moral reasons to treat artificial moral patiency as something to be avoided at least for now. (shrink)

I seek to re-approach the longstanding debate concerning the moral relevance of physical distance by emphasising the important distinction between evaluations of wrongdoing and evaluations of blameworthiness. Drawing in particular on Quality of Will accounts of blameworthiness, I argue that proximity can make an important difference to what qualifies as sufficient moral concern between strangers, and therefore to evaluations of blameworthiness for failures to assist. This implies that even if two individuals (one distant, one proximate) commit an equivalent wrong in (...) ignoring preventable suffering, it can still be the case that the proximate individual is more blameworthy insofar as their disregard expresses a more reprehensible attitude. I argue that emphasising this distinction allows us to make sense of a range of conflicting intuitions with regards to the effects of physical distance on our obligations to assist. (shrink)

Is prostitution immoral? In this book, Rob Lovering argues that it is not. Offering a careful and thorough critique of the many―twenty, to be exact―arguments for prostitution's immorality, Lovering leaves no claim unchallenged. Drawing on the relevant literature along with his own creative thinking, Lovering offers a clear and reasoned moral defense of the world's oldest profession. Lovering demonstrates convincingly, on both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist grounds, that there is nothing immoral about prostitution between consenting adults. The legal implications of this (...) view are also brought to bear on the current discourse surrounding this controversial topic. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Addressing a research gap on the relationship between mindfulness and morality, this paper draws insights from Confucius’ notion of jing. I explain how jing essentially refers to maintaining a full, respectful and humanity-centred attention towards others. To illustrate the application of Confucius’ conception of mindfulness, I use the current coronavirus pandemic as an example. On the one hand, mindfulness is useful as a coping mechanism to reduce stress for individuals during the crisis. But an amoral and atomistic approach to (...) mindfulness is inadequate in addressing social problems such as selfishness that stems from panic buying and community infection caused by inconsiderate behaviours. In this regard, Confucius’ concept of respectful attention has the potential to motivate everyone to go beyond self-interest to demonstrate deference, empathy and love towards others. A Confucian orientation of mindfulness extends the existing literature on the ethical foundations and dimensions of mindfulness for educational institutions. (shrink)

Contrary to the tendency to harmony, consensus and alignment among stakeholders in most of the literature on participation and partnership in corporate social responsibility and responsible innovation practices, in this chapter we ask which concept of participation and partnership is able to account for stakeholder engagement while acknowledging and appreciating their fundamentally different judgements, value frames and viewpoints. To this end, we reflect on a non-reductive and ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, inspired by the philosophy of Emmanuel (...) Levinas. We contrast a cognitive approach with an ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, and explore four characteristics of this ethical approach. Based on the ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, we also provide a three-stage framework for partnership formation in CSR and RI practices. (shrink)

[book blurb:] The world is changing so fast that it's hard to know how to think about what we ought to do. We barely have time to reflect on how scientific advances will affect our lives before they're upon us. New kinds of dilemma are springing up. Can robots be held responsible for their actions? Will artificial intelligence be able to predict criminal activity? Is the future gender-fluid? Should we strive to become post-human? Should we use drugs to improve our (...) intimate relationships — or to reduce crime? Our intuitions about questions like these are often both weak and confused. -/- David Edmonds has put together a philosophical task force to get to grips with these challenges. Twenty-nine philosophers present provocative and engaging pieces about aspects of life today, and life tomorrow — birth and death, health and medicine, brain and body, personal relationships, wrongdoing and justice, the internet, animals, and the environment. The future won't look the same when you've finished this book. (shrink)

Individualist ethical analyses in the enhancement debate have often prioritised or only considered the interests and concerns of parents and the future child. The collectivist critique of the human enhancement debate argues that rather than pure individualism, a focus on collectivist, or group-level ethical considerations is needed for balanced ethical analysis of specific enhancement interventions. Here, I defend this argument for the insufficiency of pure individualism. However, existing collectivist analyses tend to take a negative approach that hinders them from adequately (...) contributing to balanced ethical analysis, and often leads to a prohibitive stance. I argue this is due to two common problems with collectivist analyses: inappropriate acceptance of individualist assumptions, and failure to appropriately weigh individual vs collective ethical considerations. To further develop the collectivist critique in the enhancement debate, I suggest we may look to collectivism in public health ethics, which avoids these problems. (shrink)

A philosopher's inquiry on travel may take different paths. Emily Thomas follows several in The Meaning of Travel, where she uncovers novel philosophical debates such as the ontology of maps or the ethics of ‘doom tourism’. Perhaps unexpectedly for the reader, Thomas also offers accessible and engaging discussions on—mostly Early—Modern philosophy by connecting travel-related topics to the work of some well-known authors (René Descartes and Francis Bacon), some unjustly neglected ones (Margaret Cavendish) and some known mostly to specialists (Henry More). (...) The result of this bric-a-brac approach is mostly positive: Thomas's work stands out as an entertaining, insightful read, suitable for a wide readership, whilst also having the potential to be a foundational text in the philosophy of travel. And I agree with Thomas: philosophy of travel ‘isn’t a thing, but it should be’ (p. 3). (shrink)

As biomedical citizen science initiatives become more prevalent, the unique ethical issues that they raise are attracting policy attention. One issue identified as a significant concern is the ethical oversight of bottom-up biomedical citizen science projects that are designed and executed primarily or solely by members of the public. That is because the federal rules that require ethical oversight of research by institutional review boards generally do not apply to such projects, creating what has been called an ethics gap. -/- (...) Working to close this gap, practitioners and scholars have considered new mechanisms of ethical oversight for biomedical citizen science. To date, however, participants’ attitudes about ethics and oversight preferences have not been systematically examined. This information is useful to efforts to develop ethical oversight mechanisms because it provides a basis for evaluating the likely effectiveness of specific features of such mechanisms and their acceptability from the perspective of biomedical citizen scientists. -/- Here, we report data from qualitative interviews with 35 stakeholders in bottom-up biomedical citizen science about their general ethics attitudes and preferences regarding ethical oversight. Interviewees described ten ethical priorities and endorsed oversight mechanisms that are voluntary, community-driven, and offer guidance. Conversely, interviewees rejected mechanisms that are mandatory, hierarchical, and inflexible. Applying these findings, we conclude that expert consultation and community review models appear to align well with ethical priorities and oversight preferences of many biomedical citizen scientists, although local conditions should guide the development and use of mechanisms in specific communities. (shrink)

The commercial VR/AR marketplace is gaining ground and is becoming an ever larger and more significant component of the global economy. While much attention has been paid to the commercial promise of VR/AR, comparatively little attention has been given to the ethical issues that VR/AR technologies introduce. We here examine existing codes of ethics proposed by the ACM and IEEE and apply them to the unique ethical facets that VR/AR introduces. We propose a VR/AR code of ethics for developers and (...) apply this code to several commercial applications. (shrink)

In this chapter, I examine three deontological objections to adblocking: the objection from property (according to which adblocking involves accessing another’s property without satisfying the conditions placed on such access by the owner), the objection from complicity (according to which, by blocking ads, consumers become complicit in wrongdoing of adblocking software providers), and the objection from freeriding (according to which adblocking consumers free-ride on other consumers who allow ads to be served). I argue that, though these objections plausibly establish the (...) moral impermissibility of some instances of adblocking, they do not, even collectively, establish a blanket moral prohibition on adblocking, as it is currently done. (shrink)

Co-parents who differ in their ideal child rearing policies should compromise, argues Marcus William Hunt. Josh Milburn and Carlo Alvaro dispute this when it comes to veganism. Milburn argues that veganism is a matter of justice and that to compromise over justice is (typically) impermissible. I suggest that compromise over justice is often permissible, and that compromise over justice may be required by justice itself. Alvaro offers aesthetic, gustatory, and virtue-based arguments for ethical veganism, showing that veganism involves sensibilities and (...) virtues, and argues that veganism involves a belief. Alvaro takes this to show that parental compromise is impermissible. I suggest that Alvaro’s arguments are implausible and that the shaping of a child’s sensibilities and virtues is an apt matter for parental compromise. (shrink)

Our present moral traits are unable to provide the level of large-scale co-operation necessary to deal with risks such as nuclear proliferation, drastic climate change and pandemics. In order to survive in an environment with powerful and easily available technologies, some authors claim that we need to improve our moral traits with moral enhancement. But this is prone to produce paradoxical effects, be self-reinforcing and harm personal identity. The risks of moral enhancement require the use of a safety framework; such (...) a framework should guarantee practical robustness to moral uncertainty, empirical adequacy, correct balance between dispositions, preservation of identity, and be sensitive to practical considerations such as emergent social effects. A virtue theory can meet all these desiderata. Possible frameworks incorporate them to variable degrees. The social value orientations framework is one of the most promising candidates. (shrink)

Moral enhancements aim to morally improve a person, for example by increasing the frequency with which an individual does the right thing or acts from the right motives. Most of the applied ethics literature on moral enhancement focuses on moral bioenhancement – moral enhancement pursued through biomedical means – and considers examples such as the use of drugs to diminish aggression, suppress implicit racial biases, or amplify empathy. A number of authors have defended the voluntary pursuit of moral bioenhancement, or (...) the development of technologies that would enable it. They have highlighted the need for humans to morally improve themselves in order to address moral failures such as the oppression of women, the mistreatment of animals, and anthropogenic climate change. They have also emphasised the moral similarities between moral bioenhancement and more familiar forms of moral enhancement, such as that achieved through childhood education, introspective reflection, and engagement with literature. Critics of moral enhancement have argued that it may undermine our freedom to ‘fall’ (i.e. be immoral), and therefore our moral agency, or exacerbate the domination of individuals by political authorities. They have also questioned the potential for biomedical interventions to produce the deepest and most valuable forms of moral improvement, and have highlighted the risks that technologies for moral bioenhancement might misfire or be intentionally misused, thereby producing moral deterioration. Underlying some of these worries is the observation that there is little agreement on which psychological transformations would constitute moral improvements, and in which contexts. Defenders of moral enhancement have made various proposals for resolving or side-stepping these disagreements, but it remains unclear how far these proposals can take us beyond establishing consensus on the worst types of moral failure. (shrink)