Applied Ethics, Miscellaneous

Dans cet article, nous présentons une formulation néo-aristotélicienne de la doctrine du juste milieu. Nous commençons par décrire la formulation classique de la doctrine par Aristote, telle qu'elle est exposée dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque. Nous présentons en outre les éléments fondamentaux qui régissent les matrices de concepts (Franceschi 2002). Nous proposons ensuite une nouvelle formulation de la doctrine du juste milieu, directement dérivée de la structure-même des matrices de concepts. Nous comparons également la présente formulation de la doctrine du juste (...) milieu avec celle d'Aristote, en mettant en évidence les points communs et les différences. Nous proposons aussi une interprétation de la formulation aristotélicienne de la doctrine du juste milieu. Enfin, nous montrons comment la version néo-aristotélicienne de la doctrine du juste milieu permet de répondre à plusieurs objections, et notamment à celles qui ont été classiquement soulevées à l’encontre de sa version aristotélicienne. (shrink)

In this chapter we analyze how the experience of nostalgia, far from being necessarily understood as a tool of collective persuasion or as a refuge from an unwanted present, can also be experienced as a tool of emaciation. The reflective plexus that makes longing for a lived past possible is at the same time an opportunity for reunion, for the recognition of oneself from oneself, which offers a way with which to "sew" discontinuities by reconsidering life from a unitary perspective. (...) . We refer to opportunities - in plural - to review past errors, to reconsider successes or to reinforce forgotten elements that can regain relevance to our present eyes, allowing us, contrary to what happens when nostalgia is stimulated from outside, to find new ones. paths of empowerment and, consequently, emancipation. (shrink)

Social Aspects of Ageing - Selected Challenges, Analyses, and Solutions, focuses on the key challenges underlined by the United Nations during the Decade of Healthy Ageing (2021-2030). The authors introduce studies in areas crucial for older people, their families, and communities, such as combatting ageism, age-friendly environments, and care provision. The volume also examines issues linked to the global, national, regional, and local implementation of age-specific and intergenerational solutions, initiatives, and programs towards achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). (...) The collection contains chapters representing research and practical recommendations from various disciplines, such as critical studies, geographical gerontology, legal studies, public health, and sociology. This volume is an asset to academic and professional communities interested in theories of ageing as well as public services and ageing policies. In addition, the book aims to help students, practitioners, and people working in government, business, and nonprofit organizations. (shrink)

Intergenerational Relations - Contemporary Theories, Studies, and Policies, concentrates on actual discussions around various aspects of interactions that occur between people from different age groups and generations. The authors present studies related to four sets of challenges crucial for relationships between children, young adults, middle-aged adults, and older adults. These challenges include social and cultural challenges, economic and technological challenges, environmental challenges, and political and legal challenges. The volume also addresses issues important for the global, national, regional, and local application (...) and performance of intergenerational solutions, projects, and programs focused on achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The collection includes chapters encompassing research and practical recommendations from various disciplines such as demography, economics, ethics, management, gerontology, public health, pedagogy, social work, political science, and sociology. This book is an asset to academic and professional communities interested in theories of intergenerational relationships as well as public services and age-related policies. Moreover, the volume is a useful resource to help students, practitioners, and people working in government, business, and nonprofit organizations build positive and harmonious interactions between generations. (shrink)

Brief yet thorough and affordably priced, The Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems, Sixth Edition, is ideal for courses in introductory ethics and contemporary moral problems. Featuring forty-eight readings divided into four parts, it introduces students to ethical theory and a wide range of moral issues. The essays include selections from such historically influential philosophers as Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and Mill alongside work by contemporary philosophers like Philippa Foot, Robert Nozick, Peter Singer, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. Detailed (...) reading introductions provide helpful contextual information. (shrink)

I discuss an influential argument put forward by Hatherley in theJournal of Medical Ethics. Drawing on influential philosophical accounts of interpersonal trust, Hatherley claims that medical artificial intelligence is capable of being reliable, but not trustworthy. Furthermore, Hatherley argues that trust generates moral obligations on behalf of the trustee. For instance, when a patient trusts a clinician, it generates certain moral obligations on behalf of the clinician for her to do what she is entrusted to do. I make three objections (...) to Hatherley’s claims: (1) At least one philosophical account of interagent trust implies that medical AI is capable of being trustworthy. (2) Even if this account should ultimately be rejected, it does not matter much because what we care mostly about is that medical AI is reliable. (3) It is false that trust in itself generates moral obligations on behalf of the trustee. (shrink)

It is becoming increasingly common for authoritarian regimes to leverage digital technologies to surveil, repress and manipulate their citizens. Experts typically refer to this practice as digital authoritarianism (DA). Existing definitions of DA consistently presuppose a politically repressive agent intentionally exploiting digital technologies to pursue authoritarian ends. I refer to this as the intention-based definition. This paper argues that this definition is untenable as a general description of DA. I begin by illustrating the current predominance of the intention-based definition (Section (...) 2). Section 3 then presents four counterexamples to this definition: benign surveillance; digital sovereignty; attention-harvesting algorithms; and tech-induced loneliness. In each case, we witness authoritarianism being promoted by digital technologies without any evidence of this being intentionally caused by politically repressive agents. Based on these observations, I contend that the intention-based definition is underinclusive and is therefore unsustainable. Section 4 outlines an improved definition of DA – what I call the promotion-based definition. Since this more expansive definition does not posit intentional, politically repressive agency as a precondition of DA, it can accommodate the counterexamples discussed in Section 3. Moreover, it enables us to catch a broader spectrum of cases of DA, such as tech-induced loneliness, which those adhering to the intention-based definition are prone to overlook. After outlining further practical benefits of the promotion-based definition, I argue that we still need to distinguish between intentional and unintentional forms of DA since they call for distinct types of remedial action. -/- . (shrink)

O presente trabalho em tela busca se debruçar nas relações e interconexões entre etnocentrismo, xenofobia e medo. Entretanto, o medo é medo de alguma coisa ou de alguém. Talvez do nada. Porém, quando nos deparamos com o medo, pensamentos e práticas etnocêntricas e xenofóbicas, a literatura demonstra que há processos ligados a mecanismos de pulsão, repressão e recalque, pois o medo está como pano de fundo, causando um desencadeamento de emoções e sentimentos de um sujeito frente ao outro. Então, quando (...) dois indivíduos se encontram, há um conflito interno por questões culturais e de objetificação entre ambos. Desse modo, o conflito não é apenas pessoal ou individual, mas fundado em estruturas e formação cultural. Portanto, quando dois indivíduos distintos se encontram, também são duas culturas se defrontando. Com isso, podem ocorrer pensamentos e práticas etnocêntricas e xenofóbicas oriundas do medo, de se estar diante do outro, do diferente, do desconhecido e que não sou eu. Assim, com o medo colocado, aparece o conflito, a angústia, o repúdio e a negação do outro. E daí já se evidencia o etnocentrismo e a xenofobia. Porém, o impulso é o recalque que se reprime por medo do outro, do diferente e do desconhecido. Logo, Etnocentrismo, Xenofobia e Medo: Pulsão, Repressão e Recalque como Medo oculto do outro, do desconhecido, do diferente e do diverso, talvez tal fato só apaziguemos com um olhar com análises relativizadoras, tanto das culturas como dos outros, pois talvez assim se possa encontrar a saída de tais neuroses. A pesquisa adentra pelas teorias da Antropologia e com suportes de campos da Psicologia, História, Psicanálises e Sociologia. Desse modo, a pesquisa não abarca apenas o caráter bibliográfico e de revisão da literatura, mas também adentra sutilmente pelos caminhos da “observação e descrição” do fato e fenômeno histórico-social, fazendo assim certo esforço de “explorá-lo e explicá-lo” pelas teorias de base, que suportam o construto. (shrink)

Ang Diyos ay hindi naglalaro ng dado", inulit ni Einstein mula sa taas ng kanyang determinismo, ngunit sa katunayan ang kosmos ay naghahagis ng mga buto nito nang sadyang mapagpasya: ang mga dado nito ay laruin. Hindi sa pag-iisip na tayo ay lumikha ng mga mundo. Sa pamamagitan ng pag-unawa sa mundo natututo tayong mag-isip. Ang Cosmovision ay isang termino na dapat ay nangangahulugang isang hanay ng mga pundasyon kung saan lumalabas ang isang sistematikong pag-unawa sa Uniberso, ang mga bahagi (...) nito bilang buhay, ang mundong ating ginagalawan, kalikasan, mga phenomena ng tao, at ang kanilang mga relasyon. Ito ay, samakatuwid, isang larangan ng analytical na pilosopiya na pinapakain ng mga agham, na ang layunin ay ang pinagsama-samang at epistemologically sustainable na kaalaman tungkol sa lahat ng kung ano tayo at nilalaman, na nakapaligid sa atin, at nauugnay sa atin sa anumang paraan. Ito ay isang bagay na kasingtanda ng pag-iisip ng tao, at, bilang karagdagan sa paggamit ng mga elemento ng siyentipikong kosmolohiya, sinasaklaw nito ang lahat ng bagay sa pilosopiya at agham na tumutukoy sa uniberso at buhay. Ang cosmovision ay hindi isang set ng mga ideya, hypotheses, at assumptions kundi isang sistemang batay sa obserbasyon, pagsusuri, ebidensya, at pagpapakita. Walang cosmovision na naglalayong tukuyin, itatag, o imungkahi ngunit para lamang maunawaan, suriin, at bigyang-kahulugan. Bawat isa sa atin ay nagtatayo at naghahatid ng kanyang kosmobisyon sa buong buhay, nang hindi nagtatatag ng mga anyo, bilang isang background para sa ating pag-iisip at pag-uugali. Sa lingguwistika, ang terminong "cosmovision" ay magmumula sa Aleman, katumbas ng konsepto ng "Weltanschauung," na ginamit ng ilang mga pilosopo. Gayunpaman, ang relasyong pangwika na ito ay hindi naaangkop dahil sumasalungat ito sa aming iminumungkahi bilang isang cosmovision. Ang salitang Aleman na ito ay tumutukoy sa isang pre-logical o proto- experimental na pananaw ng realidad, na may intuitive na konteksto at malayo sa kritikal na kaalaman na wala pa rin sa oras ng pagbabalangkas nito. Walang alinlangan, ang mga cosmovision, sa diwa kung saan natin nauunawaan ang mga ito, ay nagtataglay at gumagamit ng mga proto-experimental o pre-logical na elementong ito na kinabibilangan ng kasaysayan, ang sama-samang walang malay, at lahat ng mga archetype na dala natin. Gayunpaman, sa konseptong inilalapat natin dito, ang cosmovision ay higit na lumalampas sa nilalamang ito, una sa pamamagitan ng patuloy na pagsusumite nito upang ipakita ang kritikal na pag-iisip, at sa wakas sa pamamagitan ng paggawa ng analitikong karanasan (at hindi ang kaisipan mismo o intuwisyon) ang aktwal nitong uniberso. Inilantad ni António Lopes ang lawak ng nilalamang ito: "Ang mga cosmovision ay hindi produkto ng pag-iisip. Hindi sila nagmumula sa simpleng pagnanais na malaman. Ang pagkaunawa sa katotohanan ay isang mahalagang sandali sa pagsasaayos nito, ngunit, gayunpaman, ito ay isa lamang. Ito ay nagmumula sa mahahalagang pag-uugali, mula sa karanasan ng pagsusuri sa buhay, at mula sa istruktura ng ating saykiko na kabuuan Ang pagtaas ng buhay sa kamalayan sa kaalaman sa realidad, sa pagpapahalaga, at sa kusang katotohanan ay ang mabagal at mahirap na gawain. na ginawa ng sangkatauhan sa pagbuo ng mga konsepto ng buhay (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120). Sa gawaing ito, hinahangad nating balangkasin ang isang kosmobisyon batay sa mga realidad na inaalok natin ngayon hindi nagmumungkahi, sa anumang oras, na gumawa ng agham; o magteorya ng pilosopiya, ngunit lagi nating hahanapin na suportahan sila o, hindi bababa sa, protektahan nila mula sa mga pang-unawang distorsyon na karaniwan nating dala. (shrink)

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...) technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy. (shrink)

Employers sometimes use personality tests in hiring or specifically look for candidates with certain personality traits such as being social, outgoing, active, and extraverted. Therefore, they hire based on personality, specifically extraversion in part at least. The question arises whether this practice is morally permissible. We argue that, in a range of cases, it is not. The common belief is that, generally, it is not permissible to hire based on sex or race, and the wrongness of such hiring practices is (...) based on two widely accepted principles: the Relevance Principle and the Fairness Principle. The Relevance Principle states that hiring should be based on what is relevant to job performance, while the Fairness Principle states that hiring should be based on features that individuals can control. Since hiring based on sex or race violates these principles, it is wrong. However, we argue that, in a range of cases, hiring based on extraversion also violates these principles, and assuming the validity of the Relevance and the Fairness Principles, it follows that personality discrimination is morally wrong in those cases. (shrink)

Xenotransplantation is often deemed morally objectionable because of the costs it imposes on the organ donor and the risks it imposes on the recipient. For some, involving human–pig chimeras as donors makes the practice more objectionable or even abhorrent from the start. For others, by contrast, using such chimeras weakens recipient-based objections because it reduces the risk of organ rejection and malfunctioning, and cancels donor-based objections because the practice does not harm chimeras but instead gives them valuable lives they would (...) not otherwise have. The paper examines and eventually rejects the latter defense. It also discusses the additional risks of chimeric xenotourism in countries with less demanding procedural guidelines and reflects on two very different futures for humanity that may emerge from supporting or rejecting chimeric xenotransplantation. (shrink)

When discussing the extinction of humanity, there does not seem to be any clear agreement about what ‘humanity’ really means. One aim of this paper is to show that it is a more slippery concept than it might at first seem. A second aim is to show the relationship between what constitutes or defines humanity and what gives it value. Often, whether and how we ought to prevent human extinction depends on what we take humanity to mean, which in turn (...) depends on what we value about humans. Finally, I will offer a definition of humanity that I argue offers a plausible account of when we might say humanity has gone extinct, and reflects what we value about humans, and relatedly, what many actually care about in terms of why we should be preserved. (shrink)

The application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in healthcare and epidemiology undoubtedly has many benefits for the population. However, due to its environmental impact, the use of AI can produce social inequalities and long-term environmental damages that may not be thoroughly contemplated. In this paper, we propose to consider the impacts of AI applications in medical care from the One Health paradigm and long-term global health. From health and environmental justice, rather than settling for a short and fleeting green honeymoon between (...) health and sustainability caused by AI, it should aim for a lasting marriage. To this end, we conclude by proposing that, in the upcoming years, it could be valuable and necessary to promote more interconnected health, call for environmental cost transparency, and increase green responsibility. (shrink)

We like to rate each other. We rate restaurants on Yelp, drivers on Lyft, and movies on Rotten Tomatoes. And these ratings can help us make decisions. With all of this rating going on, wouldn’t it be helpful if we rated how ethical other people are? Knowing the moral scruples of others could help us make friends, choose who to date, and avoid getting ripped off. But even though lots of ratings are useful, I don’t think that giving each other (...) a moral score is a good idea. In fact, I think it might make us even more unethical. (shrink)

Philosophers often identify forgiveness with either overcoming or forswearing blaming attitudes such as, paradigmatically, resentment for the right reasons; yet there is little debate as to which of the two (if either) is correct. In this article, I present three arguments that aim to strengthen the forswearing view. First, on the overcoming view, many paradigm cases of forgiveness would turn out to be mere ‘letting go’ instead. Second, only the forswearing view plausibly allows for forgiveness in cases where the victim (...) lost resentment before she had a reason to forgive. Third, only the forswearing view can show why victims of an offense are usually able to know whether they are in a position to forgive. (shrink)

Should people get vaccinated for the sake of others? What could ground—and limit—the normative claim that people ought to do so? In this paper, we propose a reasons-based consequentialist account of vaccination for the benefit of others. We outline eight harm-based and probabilistic factors that, we argue, give people moral reasons to get vaccinated. Instead of understanding other-directed vaccination in terms of binary moral duties (i.e., where people either have or do not have a moral duty to get vaccinated), we (...) develop a scalar approach according to which people can have stronger or weaker moral reasons to get vaccinated in view of the moral good of vaccination. One advantage of our approach is that it can capture why a person might have strong moral reasons to get vaccinated with Vaccine A, but only weak moral reasons to get vaccinated with Vaccine B. We discuss theoretical strengths of our approach and provide a case study of vaccination against COVID-19 to demonstrate its practical significance. (shrink)

Some believe that the current era is uniquely important with respect to how well the rest of human history goes. Following Parfit, call this the Hinge of History Hypothesis. Recently, MacAskill has argued that our era is actually very unlikely to be especially influential in the way asserted by the Hinge of History Hypothesis. I respond to MacAskill, pointing to important unresolved ambiguities in his proposed definition of what it means for a time to be influential and criticizing the two (...) arguments used to cast doubt on the claim that the current era is a uniquely important moment in human history. (shrink)

How can we make progress on the question of whether debate can do harm, and if it can, whether that’s a sufficient reason to suppress particular debates, or to adopt a ‘no debate!’ approach to particular topics ourselves? Obviously we’ll need to get clear on the key ingredients of the claim, which are what we’re counting as debate, and what we’re willing to countenance as harm. But we’ll also need to think about what exactly the harms are thought to be, (...) of debating any one of these controversial topics, and what, if anything, might be more important than avoiding those harms. I want to think about both the general question, which is whether the idea that debate can do harm makes sense and is sometimes true; and the more specific question, which is whether specific contemporary topics in which one side takes a ‘no debate!’ position or for which there is public support for not debating the topic, do in fact risk harm sufficient to justifying #nodebate tactics. (shrink)

To assess the intelligence of machines, Alan Turing proposed a test of imitation known as the imitation game, famously known as the Turing test. To assess whether artificial intelligent (AI) systems could be moral or not, Colin Allen et al. developed a test of imitation in the context of morality, a test known as the Moral Turing Test (MTT), which I will, in this paper, call the moral imitation game. There are arguments against developing any type of MTT or moral (...) imitation game. Rather than developing a moral imitation game, this paper proposes a criterion of imitation for AI systems in the moral scenario. To develop a criterion of imitation, I explore the notion of moral attribution in detail. Within the case of moral attribution, I introduce the subject‐ascriber distinction. The notion of moral attribution and the subject‐ascriber distinction is employed to address the following questions: (a) how is the assessment in MTT arranged?, (b) what is the role of the interrogator in the MTT?, and (c) what information is to be concealed from the interrogator? The first question deals with the aspect of assessment, the second question deals with the reordering of the role of the interrogator and the third one deals with the concealment aspect of the imitation game. After that, a criterion of imitation for AI systems is put forward. Using the subject‐ascriber distinction in moral attribution and David Lewis' Mad Pain and Martian Pain cases, it is argued that the notion of sentience is insignificant for the ascriber for moral attributions. (shrink)

This paper analyses Spalding’s Betrachtung über die Bestimmung des Menschen (1748) through a translation proposal that tries to point out the human disposal to act ethically. In accord with modern German use, I argue for a translation of Bestimmung as disposition. In the first part of the article, I deal with the relevant issues for a philosophy of human experience that are present in Spalding’s text. In the second one, I bring the translation proposal into the philosophical domain showing how (...) the Bestimmung as disposition suits the human nature, in particular for what concerns the ethics, namely the way humans are arranged to act with others, and things in a non-egoistic mode. The analysis rests on two philosophical concepts: Sorge (Heidegger) and Liebe (Jaspers), that give a description of the essential relational component of human beings in which to take care, to love, and to discover our surrounding world are the key points. (shrink)

The police are one of the important law enforcement agency in Bangladesh. Police are the best agency to protect human rights. Indeed, the police have a special responsibility to protect people. In addition, to their duty, they also serve in people's social and moral call, especially during COVID-19 situations they imprint many examples of humanity. People experience many good deeds of police during a national disaster as well. However, allegation against the police for violations of human rights is not uncommon. (...) Cases of torture, death in police custody, involvement in the drug trade and robberies, entrapment with drug, helping in land grabbing, etc. are being published in newspapers. Nevertheless, to protect human rights or to take care of human rights is the prime function of the police. This research efforts to find out the answer to why police violate human rights. This research may help police professionals or administrators in taking policy initiatives to erase the negative image of the police. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is booming, and AI ethics is booming with it. Yet there is surprisingly little attention paid to what the discipline of AI ethics is and what it ought to be. This paper offers an ameliorative definition of AI ethics to fill this gap. We introduce and defend an original distinction between novel and applied research questions. A research question should count as AI ethics if and only if (i) it is novel or (ii) it is applied and (...) has gained new importance through the development of AI. We argue that a lack of such a definition contributes to six disciplinary problems: ethics washing and lobbying, limited applicability, dilution of the field, conceptual bloating, costs of AI ethics, and an internal dispute. Based on our definition, we construct a methodological framework for AI ethics and show how it helps address these problems. (shrink)

Este número de acceso abierto tiene como objetivo resaltar los puntos de vista de los países latinoamericanos sobre la justicia en un contexto de pandemia y contribuir al diálogo entre estos y con la comunidad científica global. Explora los desafíos globales de la pandemia de COVID-19, las diferencias relevantes entre las medidas de salud pública y su impacto en los países de ingresos altos versus los países de ingresos bajos o medios, y cómo la injusticia global se profundizó debido a (...) la pandemia de COVID-19. También llama la atención sobre las experiencias, los resultados y las respuestas del norte global a la pandemia con respecto a poblaciones vulnerables y trayectorias de exposición que se reproducen en América Latina. (shrink)

Imagine a person with a compulsive illness that leads her to frequently wash her hands. She will scrub her hands under all sorts of bizarre conditions, such as seeing a garbage truck drive down the road or hearing the word ‘trash’ on television. Sometimes her hands do need to be cleaned but this is usually a fortunate coincidence. This person does not have control over her behavior because she cannot help herself from washing her hands (unless dire consequences were to (...) follow, such as the threat of imminent death, poisonous gassing of her children, and so on). Because she lacks control over her behavior, most people are inclined to think that she is not responsible for her compulsive washing or any harm that comes of it. We might even think that it is inappropriate to blame her if she cannot stop washing when she ought to. Importantly, the impact of her illness extends beyond the issues of responsibility and blame since it impacts the degree to which she is autonomous. After all, if she experiences extreme discomfort or alienation from her washing then it seems reasonable to suppose that her compulsive behavior does not truly represent her (or her deeper self). -/- This is the story that many philosophers of agency who have written about obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) tell. These theorists tend to depict those with OCD as lacking control over their behavior to such a degree that their moral responsibility and capacity for self-governance are impaired or obviated. So understood, people with OCD are of interest to philosophers of agency only insofar as they provide a colorful counterexample to one theory or another. But this story is false. In fact, it is really a caricature of the disorder that not only obscures its nature but, and more importantly, obscures the serious implications that OCD (properly understood) has for our understanding of core agential concepts, such as moral responsibility or identification with an attitude. In my dissertation I both correct this long-standing and entrenched misunderstanding of OCD in philosophical literature and work out the implications it carries for our understanding of human agency. -/- On my approach, an accurate understanding of OCD requires examining leading psychiatric literature on the disorder as well as consulting the words and experiences of people living with OCD. Although the disorder is formally defined in terms of experiencing thoughts, images, or impulses (obsessions) alongside rituals the person feels pressure to complete (compulsions), the thematic presentation of these symptoms can vary widely. For example, in Story of a Soul, St. Therese of Liseaux describes “a terrible disease of the scruples” that filled her with seemingly sinful thoughts, driving her to repeatedly pray and visit confession with little relief. In contrast, J. J. Keeler describes painful obsessions about unknowingly causing a fatal traffic collision, leading to hours spent retracing her route, scouring the news for reports of a hit-and-run, and so on. Yet despite this diversity, nearly all manifestations of OCD involve dysfunctional beliefs. These beliefs typically over-represent the chance of harm associated with an action and the person’s responsibility for preventing or causing harm. Consequently, they make those with OCD more likely to experience exaggeration of certain features of their environment or stimuli, skewing and disrupting their thinking and deliberation, leading them to engage in, as I argue, voluntary and intentional compulsive rituals aimed at averting harm and relieving anxiety. St. Therese’s sinful thoughts involve her dysfunctional beliefs about perfection, about what harms or helps her relationship with God, and about her responsibility for having those thoughts. She is driven to voluntarily pray as an attempt to relieve her anxiety and to make good with God. By comparison, Keeler obsesses that she may have caused or will cause a death and so checks her behavior on the road constantly and reduces ‘dangerous activities’ (such as driving on highways). In these memoirs we see that the pattern of beliefs at work in OCD can lead agents like Therese and Keeler to interpret certain acts as courting disaster when they are not especially risky, or certain thoughts and ideas as blasphemous when they are not representative of who that person is. -/- As noted, when philosophers discuss OCD in the context of moral responsibility, their depictions tend to stress a lack of control over one’s behavior. In reason-responsive theories, the person with OCD is thought to be unable to properly react to sufficient reasons for action even if she is able to recognize that they exist and have bearing. This is termed a failure of reason-reactivity. This is how one theorist, Michael Mckenna, frames his example of Handy the compulsive handwasher. Handy is a purported counterexample to Fischer & Ravizza’s reason-responsive theory (semicompatibilism) because Handy can recognize and react to at least one sufficient reason to refrain from washing his hands (despite ostensibly being a compelled agent). McKenna caricatures OCD by under-describing Handy’s mental states and over-emphasizing his limited ability to abstain from washing his hands in the presence of powerful countervailing considerations (e.g., to save the life of his child). McKenna’s example of Handy chiefly ignores the robust cognitive features of the disorder described above, specifically the agent’s beliefs about her own obsessions and compulsions and how they relate to the world around her. In contrast to this depiction of OCD, I argue that people with OCD are overly receptive to apparent reasons for action, seeing reasons where there are none or distorting the weight certain reasons have in deliberation. Furthermore, an accurate picture of OCD reveals that most people with the disorder do possess guidance control and are thus morally responsible. If we wish to argue that these agents are blameless, we must refine our understanding of what it means to ‘resist’ a compulsion. Instead, we must understand the difficulty associated with resisting the dysfunctional beliefs at the heart of OCD. -/- The fact that people with OCD are overly receptive to apparent reasons for action has implications not just for responsibility and freedom but also for other core concepts in agency like identification and autonomy. Identification generally refers to attitudes that ‘stand for’ an agent and so have the authority to represent her. Some philosophers argue that internal attitudes (those the agent identifies with) must be explicitly endorsed by the agent in some kind of reflective process, while others argue that more fundamental attitudes (such as our cares) are internal. Stretching back to Frankfurt’s first description of identification, obsessions have long been considered external to the agent, usually because obsessive thoughts are experienced as unwanted or upsetting. For example, Keeler’s thought that she has caused a fatal hit-and-run is distressing because the thought of having harmed someone so much is unbearable. Similarly, the rituals Keeler engages in, like checking the news for accident reports or searching the exterior of her car for blood, are upsetting to her even though they are aimed at relieving her distress. However, the same features of the disorder that lead people with OCD to become overwhelmed by reasons also appear to lead some to develop caring-like behaviors. For example, when Keeler experiences obsessions about the risk of hitting someone with her car, she becomes particularly attuned to situations in which she perceives her behavior as a threat to others on the road. In response Keeler takes serious steps to change her driving habits, including driving on surface roads rather than highways or traveling well under the speed limit. This behavior closely tracks the way agents behave when they care about something (whether it is a person, a value, an outcome). This means that, contrary to the way philosophers have hitherto understood clinical obsessions, obsessions can be internal to the agent and speak for her in a meaningful way. As I argue this is a feature and not a bug. In fact, it is a very significant, and from a therapeutic point of view, very worrying feature. This is because those cases of OCD that most resemble caring are also those in which the person lacks significant insight into her own disorder. The disorder is hidden from her own insight precisely because it is expressed in what she most cares about. Such individuals are often the most ill in terms of symptom severity and recovery trajectory. Reframing this behavior as dysfunctional caring explains why these obsessions take on ever greater significance to the agent and take up increasing space in her deliberative horizon. This finding, in turn, may indicate that therapies aimed at externalizing obsessions and removing them from one’s deliberative agenda could wear away at otherwise recalcitrant obsessions and compulsive rituals. -/- Mischaracterizations of OCD in philosophy of agency have driven a number of problematic depictions of the disorder, and the arguments built around such mischaracterizations are necessarily deficient. Depicting OCD as largely about control has yoked our discussions of the disorder’s symptoms to older, inaccurate conceptions of psychological compulsion as a kind of force. This has been to our theoretical detriment since it has concealed the degree to which compulsion in OCD is both voluntary and purposeful as well as driven significantly by dysfunctional beliefs. Recognizing these features of OCD and their impact on agency has significant implications for the way we theorize about concepts like responsibility and identification. For example, if people with OCD do possess guidance control then we must reassess our intuition that they are excused from blame, or else modify our understanding of what the relevant excusing conditions are. Similarly, understanding that seriously ill people with OCD may display caring-like behavior may inform our understanding of internality’s role in agency as well as potential treatment methods. (shrink)

En el presente artículo abordaremos el marco político y jurídico de la atención sanitaria intercultural de mujeres indígenas en Argentina, en particular, en la provincia de Neuquén. El objetivo es realizar una revisión sistemática del marco jurídico normativo producido en los distintos programas sanitarios que propician la atención de salud con un enfoque intercultural, centrada concretamente en las mujeres mapuce de Neuquén. Finalmente, nos enfocaremos en la contradicción que se produce cuando, por un lado, se defiende un enfoque sanitario intercultural (...) desde los marcos político-discursivo y jurídico, y, por el otro, se aplica un modelo sanitario biomédico, con tintes patriarcalistas. (shrink)

En este ensayo nos proponemos realizar algunas consideraciones argumentativas breves sobre la ética en investigaciones con seres humanos vulnerables. Para ello, examinaremos el conocido caso de Tuskegee (Alabama), ocurrido entre los años 1932-1972, en el que 600 personas afroamericanas fueron inoculadas con sífilis sin su consentimiento. Luego, desde una postura crítica, abordaremos el caso desde tres perspectivas bioéticas. En primer lugar, lo analizaremos desde el plano jurídico-normativo, luego desde el principialismo formulado por Tom Beauchamp y James Childress, y finalmente, desde (...) el enfoque conceptual de la “vulnerabilidad”, referido a las poblaciones participantes en las investigaciones bioéticas. En efecto, nos centraremos en los miramientos que estos enfoques plantean de forma expresa, para realizar un análisis reflexivo sobre el necesario aspecto ético, requerido en el seno de toda investigación bioética con personas vulnerables. (shrink)

En este artículo se plantean las bases del marco ético-normativo que intervienen en la atención sanitaria de las mujeres en general, y de las mujeres mapuce, en particular. Posteriormente, se realiza un abordaje de las mujeres indígenas analizando su situación concreta, a partir de considerar de manera crítica la confluencia intersectorial de distintos sistemas opresivos que articulan las relaciones de género, clase y etnia. Para ello, el planteo se centrará en el estudio de esta problemática desde la perspectiva feminista latinoamericana, (...) que será, seguidamente, retomada y contrastada desde la voz propia de mujeres que se autoidentifican como mapuce. El objetivo del artículo se centra en poner de manifiesto las múltiples dificultades que presentan las mujeres indígenas en el acceso a la salud, con el propósito de justificar la necesidad de articular políticas públicas que promuevan la democratización del acceso sanitario, en tanto derecho humano. Para ello, realizaremos un abordaje teórico-normativo que ponga en evidencia las responsabilidades éticas y políticas del Estado, como ente garante del acceso a la salud de sus ciudadanos, en particular de los más vulnerados, como lo son las mujeres de comunidades indígenas en nuestro país. (shrink)

For all the recent talk of people failing or succeeding as allies to oppressed groups, a well worked out philosophical theory of what it is for someone to be an ally is conspicuously absent. This makes it difficult to evaluate the claims of people failing or succeeding as allies, and consequently diminishes the concept’s usefulness to disadvantaged groups by making it difficult to identify who will genuinely help to further their interests. We aim to rectify this absence by answering the (...) following question: what is an ally? On the view that we develop, allyship is a regrettably hierarchical relationship that holds between a privileged individual and an oppressed group, and is formed through a series of actions taken by the privileged individual in a bid to contribute towards bringing that hierarchy to an end. (shrink)

In discussions of nudging, transparency is often taken to be important; it is often suggested that a significant moral consideration to take into account when nudging is whether the nudge is transparent. Another consideration taken to be relevant is whether the nudge is easy to resist. Sometimes, these two considerations are taken to be importantly related: if we have reason to make nudges easy to resist, then we have reason to make them transparent, insofar as a nudge’s transparency is relevant (...) to whether the nudge is easy to resist. In this paper, we critically scrutinize this view. First, we draw out the purported connections between transparency and resistibility, combining them into what we call the Resistibility-to-Transparency Argument (RTA). Then, we do some conceptual groundwork elaborating on different forms of transparency mentioned in the debate. With this in place, we argue that in order to be plausible, the RTA must appeal to certain forms of transparency; those on which the transparency of a nudge depends on the nudgee’s ability to become aware of the relevant facts about the nudge. We then argue against the common assumption that in order for a nudge to be easy to resist for an individual, that individual needs to have the capacity to easily become aware of the relevant nudge facts. We conclude that the connection between the easy resistibility of a nudge and its transparency is, at best, a weak one. (shrink)

This is a public philosophy article that aims to make available an idea about abortion from my Sex, Love, and Gender book.

This chapter examines the case for health care policies aimed at holding obese individuals responsible for their weight and for obesity-related health issues. In particular, it considers the merits of two arguments for policies that would seek to make obese individuals bear some of the higher health care costs associated with being that way. On the fairness argument, it is claimed that such policies would serve the interests of fairness by holding obese individuals to account for irresponsible lifestyle choices that (...) are linked to their higher weight and its associated health risks. On the public health promotion argument, it is claimed that adopting such policies could produce impressive public health benefits: encouraging people to make healthier lifestyle choices, reducing obesity rates, and reducing obesity-related health care spending. Both arguments face serious objections. Contrary to the fairness argument, policies aimed at holding obese individuals responsible for their weight or for related health problems would neither treat people as they deserve to be treated nor make the distribution of health care resources fairer. And contrary to the public health promotion argument, those policies would not produce better health outcomes for society at large. Indeed, they would tend to do just the opposite. Reflection on the shortcomings of those arguments reveals that their conclusion is false: society should not adopt policies aimed at holding obese individuals responsible for their weight or for obesity-related health problems. (shrink)

The philosophical framework of justice proposed by Nancy Fraser during the 1990s establishes two equally crucial dimensions of justice: redistribution, linked to the allocation of economic goods, and recognition, linked to the assignment of social status. This division makes it possible to distinguish between transformative strategies that intervene in the causes of social injustices and affirmative strategies that focus on their effects. However, the author’s treatment of her notion of “two-dimensional category”, which combines inequalities of redistribution and recognition, has limits (...) for thinking about the functioning of certain systems of social subordination and the situation of certain social groups. In this paper, I will use a queer-crip perspective to argue that both heterocissexism and ableism are two-dimensional categories, since they structure an unequal status system, but also sustain, define, and naturalize the capitalist mode of production and are functional to its distribution of economic goods. This critical review allows us to adapt the Fraserian framework to the current socio-political context. (shrink)

In this introduction, we argue for a basic idea. Community-based spaces for promoting forgiveness and memory-making bear the promise of promoting some of the cultural transformations needed for thick, structural reconciliation. As we show by discussing some recent examples taken from the Colombian context of the past decade, these spaces do not compete, but actually complement a pragmatic, thin institutional design for reconciliation. This idea, as we discuss here, serves as the common thread connecting the articles in this special issue. (...) The texts reflect on the practice of forgiveness and some of its specific contours in the context of the Colombian conflict. (shrink)

The prominent philosopher Bernard Williams (1985) opened his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy with: “It is not a trivial question, Socrates said: what we are talking about is how one should live” (p. 1) and asked whether Socrates’ question is the proper starting point for moral philosophy. In this paper, I will explore an effect of a very specific life event: a “cliff-edge” retirement. I will look at the concept of ground projects and show how cliff-edge retirements create ill-shaped (...) projects reflecting the loss of important workplace benefits such as purposeful work and social collaborations. This type of retirement prematurely closes the ground project before its natural conclusion. I will argue that attempts to recover it will likely prove difficult, inauthentic and will not remedy the project’s wrongful shape. (shrink)

In this chapter the explanatory value of four conceptions of human dignity to account for two seemingly contradictory intuitions is tested. One is that many people think poverty violates the humanity of poor people. The other intuition is that poor people often act with remarkable dignity despite their trying circumstances. First Immanuel Kant’s influential view on human dignity that claims it is grounded in humans’ capability to make moral judgments is examined. Next, Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the capability approach is (...) tested, which is hugely influential across many academic disciplines and in the world of economic development. Thereafter, two related, though distinctly different African theories of human dignity, as offered by Thaddeus Metz and Polycarp Ikuenobe are assessed. Both base their theories on the core capacity of humans to engage in harmonious relationships within communities. Last, it is investigated the theory that Avishai Margalit provides of honour and humiliation as concepts that illuminate the value and risks for humans’ possession of dignity. His theory is linked to aspects of the recognition theory of Axel Honneth. In the end, it is concluded that these theories either cannot fully, or adequately, explain the complex relationship between poverty and human dignity. (shrink)

If states are permitted to create and maintain a military force, by what means are they permitted to do so? This paper argues that a theory of just recruitment should incorporate a concern for moral risk. Since the military is a morally risky profession for its members, recruitment policies should be evaluated in terms of how they distribute moral risk within a community. We show how common military recruitment practices exacerbate and concentrate moral risk exposure, using the UK as a (...) case study. We argue that the British state wrongs its citizens by subjecting them to excessively morally risky recruitment practices. Since, we argue, this risk exposure cannot be justified by appealing to the benefits of a military career for recruits, our argument calls for reform of existing practices. Our method of evaluation is generalizable and thus can be used to assess other states’ practices. (shrink)

With its unique blend of humor and deep self-examination, “Meandering Sobriety” ensures that every reader will interpret and experience its wisdom in a truly personal and enlightening way.

It has recently been argued that to tackle social injustice, implicit biases and unjust social structures should be targeted equally because they sustain and ontologically overlap with each other. Here I develop this thought further by relating it to the hypothesis of extended cognition. I argue that if we accept common conditions for extended cognition then people’s implicit biases are often partly realized by and so extended into unjust social structures. This supports the view that we should counteract psychological and (...) social contributors to injustice equally. But it also has a significant downside. If unjust social structures are part of people’s minds then dismantling these structures becomes more difficult than it currently is, as this will then require us to overcome widely accepted ethical and legal barriers protecting people’s bodily and personal integrity. Thus, while there are good grounds to believe that people’s biases and unjust social structures ontologically overlap, there are also strong ethical reasons to reject this view. Metaphysical and ethical intuitions about implicit bias hence collide in an important way. (shrink)

However, people might wonder, did all Chinese students engage in school learning before the creation of electronic games? The answer is definitely no, and apart from gaming, students back in the day would skip classes to attend other activities perceived as “irrelevant” to school learning.

Cuốn sách dày hơn 120 trang, vừa được tác giả hoàn thành vào đầu năm nay, có những bài viết đề cập những vấn đề vẫn còn đang được bàn luận nhiều như ChatGPT (ChatGPT, help!). Tổng cộng cuốn sách gồm khoảng 40 bài viết ngắn, dựa trên bối cảnh và hình thái xã hội Việt Nam, được chia thành ba phần: Science Sobriety (tạm dịch: Tỉnh thức trong khoa học); Business Intelligence (Tri thức kinh doanh); và Mandering Thought (Suy (...) nghĩ vẩn vơ). (shrink)

US law continues its historical trend of growing more permissive towards actors who engage in violent action in purported self-defense. We draw on some informal game theory to show why this is strategically irrational and suggest rolling back self-defense doctrines like stand your ground to earlier historical precedents like duty to retreat.

Central to philosophical practice is the application of philosophers' work by philosophical practitioners to inspire, educate, and guide their clients. For example, in Logic-Based Therapy (LBT) philosophical practitioners help their clients to find an uplifting philosophy that promotes guiding virtues that counteract unrealistic and often self-defeating conclusions derived from irrational premises. I will present the argument that Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics can be applied as an uplifting philosophy as per LBT methodology, and therefore has utility for philosophical practice. Additionally, (...) I will propose that Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics, as an uplifting philosophy, may act as an antidote for ideological obsession and ideology addiction. I will also suggest that LBT may be a suitable intervention when challenging the unrealistic conclusions derived from illogical premises in practical reasoning that contribute to ideological obsession, because it can contest irrational beliefs in a way that could mitigate the fragmentation anxiety that often arise when individuals relinquish maladaptive self-object organizations. (shrink)

Mark Coeckelbergh (Int J Soc Robot 1:217–221, 2009) argues that robot ethics should investigate what interaction with robots can do to humans rather than focusing on the robot’s moral status. We should ask what robots do to our sociality and whether human–robot interaction can contribute to the human good and human flourishing. This paper extends Coeckelbergh’s call and investigate what it means to live with disembodied AI-powered agents. We address the following question: Can the human–AI interaction contribute to our moral (...) development? We present an empirically informed philosophical analysis of how the AI personal assistant Siri changes its users’ way of life, based on the responses obtained from 20 semi-directive individual interviews with Siri users. We identify changes in the users’ social interaction associated with the adoption of Siri. These changes include: (1) the indirect effect of reducing opportunities of human interaction, (2) the second-order effect of diminished expectations toward each other in a community, and (3) the acquired preference to obtain hassle-free interaction with Siri over human interaction. We examine them in relation to concerns that are voiced in the current debates over the rise of AI, namely the suspicion that humans could become overly reliant on AI (Danaher 2019) and the worry that social AI could impede on moral development (Fröding and Peterson, Ethics Inf Technol 23:207–214, 2012; Li, Ethics Inf Technol 23:543–550, 2021). We analyze the ethical costs that come from these changes in light of virtue ethics and address potential objections along the way. We end by offering directions for thinking about how to live with AI personal assistant while preserving favorable conditions for moral development. (shrink)