Labor, Liberty, and Property: A Critique of the Liberal Theory of Property of Locke, Nozick, and Rawls
Dissertation, The University of Rochester (
1983)
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Abstract
The right to private property plays an important role in liberal political theory. In this thesis I consider versions of the liberal theory of property developed by Locke, Nozick, and Rawls, arguing that each fails to give an adequate account of the nature and justification of the right to private property. Although Locke establishes a natural right to private property based on the moral value of labor, his theory cannot justify an inviolable right to private property where it is not entailed by the right to self-preservation. Nor does Locke establish the preservation of property claims as a rational choice for the final end of government. ;Nozick modifies Locke's theory of property insofar as he considers the crucial connection to be between property and liberty, rather than property and self-preservation. Nozick's justification of an inviolable right of private property fails because he offers no reason to value the liberty to dispose of goods protected by a system of private property over the liberty to use that is secured in a system of property based on common ownership. ;Rawls also adopts liberty as the primary human good, but argues that an extended right to private property is not required by justice. The right to property is not one of the basic liberties protected by the principles of justice. While I accept this aspect of his theory, I argue that Rawls also fails to give a consistent account of the connection between liberty and property. Given his position on the priority of liberty, Rawls ought to require that any infringement on the ability to exercise the basic liberties due to the institution of private property be prohibited. ;A unique system of property rights cannot be determined solely on the basis of liberty. The liberal conception of person as a rational creature with his own conception of the good does not provide a means for evaluating the liberties that compete in the choice of a property system. In the conclusion, I argue that this is a significant failure for the liberal theory of justice