Abstract

One contemporary approach to the perennial problem of reconciling determinism and human freedom is to argue that human actions are not the sort of entities that could possibly be causally determined. That is, it is contended that there are conceptual reasons why human actions cannot be regarded as effects of which antecedent events are the causes. My aim in this dissertation is to explicate and to examine critically the arguments that have been used to support this contention, which may be called "anti-causalism." ;After a preliminary clarification of the concepts on which the discussion focuses, I turn to the most popular anti-causalist argument. This is the claim that the items to which we appeal in everyday explanations of actions--items like the agent's desires, beliefs, motives, and intentions--are "logically connected" with those actions in a manner in which a genuine cause cannot be connected with its effect. Many versions of this "logical connection" argument have been put forward. Chapter Two of the dissertation examines several such versions, contending that none of them, when spelled out, is valid. Chapter Three argues that even a valid logical connection argument, if possible, would not establish that human actions could have no causes whatsoever. ;The final chapter turns to anti-causalist arguments grounded on the distinction between human actions and bodily movements. I try to show that one such argument, properly formulated, provides at least some reason to believe that actions cannot be causally determined. This, however, does not imply that actions cannot be caused. I suggest how the latter proposition might be supported with an argument about actions paralleling Wittgenstein's view of "mental states" as not being events or processes of any kind. The potential of this approach, and the problems it faces, are sketched. Finally, however, I conclude that even a successful demonstration that actions cannot be caused would not achieve the goal of those who have advanced such a position--it would provide no escape from the clash between determinism and the belief that at least some human actions are free