Abstract

The question: Why, if at all, is justice the first virtue of social institutions? is one of the chief questions of current political philosophy. But political philosophers have not asked: Why should societies strive to be just? In answer, this paper argues that societies should strive for social justice because unless they do so, morality will lack legitimate authority for most of its members. Call this "the undermining morality explanation." The paper first considers and tries to rebut three alternative views: the Rawlsian explanation from the finality condition; the Hegelian explanation from the value of reconciling people to their social world; and the Frankfurt-school solidarity explanation, which is from the value of achieving universal societal solidarity. The paper then argues for the undermining morality explanation, on the grounds that (1) if a society does not strive for social justice, it will not provide a majority of its members with the self-respect necessary for valuing themselves and all other people as human; (2) that if a majority of society's members cannot so value themselves and others, then for them morality lacks its requiring force; and (3) if morality lacks legitimate authority for most of its members, then the evils which morality is designed to reduce and eliminate will beset society. The paper then shows why avoiding causing those evils is obligatory for society, and offers reasons for thinking that this explanation is superior to its three rivals. If the thesis defended here is right, then one of morality's foundations is social justice.