Erkenntnis:1-22 (forthcoming)

Authors
Chris Dorst
University of Florida
Abstract
This paper aims to explain why the laws of nature are held fixed in counterfactual reasoning. I begin by highlighting three salient features of counterfactual reasoning: it is conservative, nomically guided, and it uses hindsight. I then present a rationale for our engagement in counterfactual reasoning that aims to make sense of these features. In particular, I argue that counterfactual reasoning helps us evaluate the evidential relations between unanticipated pieces of evidence and various hypotheses of interest about the history of the actual world. Given this goal, it makes a great deal of sense that counterfactual reasoning would have the aforementioned features. Additionally, it turns out that this account of counterfactual reasoning is nicely congruent with Humean views of laws. Specifically, it can explain, in a Humean-friendly way, both why the laws are counterfactually resilient, and why we may be inclined to have anti-Humean intuitions in the first place, even if some form of Humeanism is correct.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-019-00207-1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,242
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Humean Laws and (Nested) Counterfactuals.Christian Loew & Siegfried Jaag - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):93-113.
Causal Overdetermination for Humeans?Michael Esfeld - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (2):99-104.
A Note on Scientific Essentialism, Laws of Nature, and Counterfactual Conditionals.Marc Lange - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):227 – 241.
Popper on Laws and Counterfactuals.Danilo Šuster - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):109-119.
Laws and Their Stability.Marc Lange - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):415Ð432.
Counterfactuals and the Law.Simon Beck - 1993 - South African Journal of Philosophy 12 (3).
Why Are the Laws of Nature So Important to Science?Marc Lange - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):625-652.
Do the Closest Counterfactual Worlds Contain Miracles?Phillip Goggans - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):137 - 149.
Why Are the Laws of Nature so Important to Science?Marc Lange - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):625-652.
Causation S Ans Time.Sam Baron & Kristie Miller - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):27-40.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-01-02

Total views
36 ( #286,885 of 2,419,597 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #191,887 of 2,419,597 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes