Abstract

The epistemological position I espouse in order to reject the value neutrality thesis can be used to underpin certain arguments which have been levelled against the very idea of a 'value free' economic science. Since the economist qua economist makes value judgments not only in the context of justification but also in the so-called contexts of discovery and application of economic theory, any claim to the effect that economic inquiry can be, or ought to be, value free, is seen to be quite implausible. In order to reinforce this conclusion I argue that the pragmatist conception of the aims of economic inquiry provides an epistemological rationale for the claim that the conception of economics as a science of allocation must be rejected in favour of a conception of economics as a science of political economy. Taken as a whole this paper represents a contribution to a future value critical methodology of economic inquiry. ;Having rejected the thesis of the value neutrality of economic science, I argue that the introduction of ethical considerations into theory choice does not entail eschewing 'objectivity' as an ideal of economic inquiry, nor does it necessarily result in the intellectual chaos, the impossibility of constructing an intersubjectively testable body of economic theory as feared by proponents of the value neutrality thesis. To this end I argue that adoption of the pragmatist conception of the aims of inquiry does not entail an 'anything goes' attitude with respect to the sorts of value judgments relevant to theory appraisal and, in any case, those value judgments which may properly be included among the criteria relevant to theory choice are capable of being justified on rational grounds. I construct a rule of acceptance for hypotheses which allows economic theory to be appraised on the basis of both ethical and epistemic considerations while requiring both sorts of considerations to be made explicit by the economist. The acceptance rule which I propose as suitable to the pragmatist conception of the aims of science is capable of serving both as an instrument for the critical appraisal of economic theory and as a heuristic device guiding the construction of economic theory. ;According to the thesis of the value neutrality of economic science, the economist qua economist makes no value judgments in the context of justifying economic theory. I argue that this thesis is indefensible. ;The particular argument I advance to support my claim that the value neutrality thesis is untenable is set within the framework of the debate concerning the 'proper' or 'legitimate' aims of scientific inquiry presently being waged among philosophers. In opposition to the standard, cognitivist, view that the aim of science is to attain 'interesting truth' ie truth qualified by other cognitive values such as explanatory power, systematizing power, predictive content and so on, I claim, with the pragmatist, that the aim of science is 'valuable truth', a complex notion reflecting the scientists concern not only with the 'cognitive' or 'epistemic' dimension of inquiry, but also with the 'practical' or 'pragmatic' dimension arising from a concern to help people realize desirable human ends. Conceiving the aim of economics to be the attainment of 'valuable truth' concerning the workings of the economic universe, I claim that economic theory ought, rationally, to be appraised on the basis of certain ethical considerations in addition to the standard epistemic criteria of theory choice, that certain of the economists value judgments play a legitimate role in the scientific appraisal of economic theory