‘Consciousness’ as an ‘identifiable’ something

Academia.Edu (2024)
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Abstract

'Consciousness' is not ontologically primary but is in fact a second-order phenomenon dependent on the ontologically primordial capacity to apprehend and identify elements of ordinary experience.

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